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Abstract. In this paper we develop cyclic proof systems for the problem
of inclusion between the least sets of models of mutually recursive predi-
cates, when the ground constraints in the inductive definitions belong to
the quantifier-free fragments of (i) First Order Logic with the canonical
Herbrand interpretation and (ii) Separation Logic, respectively. Inspired
by classical automata-theoretic techniques of proving language inclusion
between tree automata, we give a small set of inference rules, that are
proved to be sound and complete, under certain semantic restrictions,
involving the set of constraints in the inductive system. Moreover, we
investigate the decidability and computational complexity of these re-
strictions for all the logical fragments considered and provide a proof
search semi-algorithm that becomes a decision procedure for the entail-
ment problem, for those systems that fulfill the restrictions.
1 Introduction
Inductive definitions play an important role in computing, being an essential
component of the syntax and semantics of programming languages, databases,
automated reasoning and program verification systems. The main advantage of
using inductive definitions is the ability of reasoning about sets of logical objects,
by means of recursion. The semantics of these definitions is defined in terms of
least fixed points of higher-order functions on assignments of predicates to sets
of models. A natural problem is the entailment, that asks whether the least
solution of one predicate is included in the least solution of another. Examples
of entailments are language inclusion between finite-state (tree) automata or
context-free grammars, or verification conditions generated by shape analysis
tools using specifications of recursive data structures as contracts of program
correctness.
The principle of Infinite Descent [Bus18], initially formalized by Fermat, has
become an important tool for reasoning about entailments between inductively
defined predicates. In a nutshell, a proof by infinite descent is a particular proof
by contradiction, in which we assume the existence of a counterexample from
a well-founded domain and show that this leads to the existence of a strictly
smaller counterexample for the same entailment problem. By repeating this step,
we obtain an infinite descending chain of counterexamples, which is impossible
because we assumed the domain of interpretation to be well-founded. Hence,
there is no counterexample to start with and the entailment holds. This principle
is found in all cyclic proof systems, where branches of a sequent calculus proof
are closed by specific infinite descent rules [BS11].
The interest for automatic proof generation is two-fold. On the one hand,
machine-checkable proofs are certificates for the correctness of the answer given
by an automated checker, that increase our trust in the reliability of a particular
implementation. For instance, the need for proof generation as means of certify-
ing SMT solvers has been widely recognized, see e.g. [SOR+13]. In this paper we
provide means to certify implementations of automata-theoretic algorithms, such
as language inclusion and emptiness for (tree) automata [WDHR06,HLSV11].
On the other hand, the existence of a sound and complete proof system pro-
vides a (theoretical) decision procedure for the entailment problem, based on the
following argument. Assuming that the sets of models and derivations are both
recursively enumerable, one can interleave the enumeration of counter-models
with the enumeration of derivations; if the entailment holds one finds a finite
proof (provided that the proof system is complete), or a finite counterexample,
otherwise. Moreover, proof generation can be made effective by providing suit-
able strategies that limit the possibilities of applying the inference rules and
guide the search towards finding a proof or a counterexample.
In this paper we give a set of inference rules that are shown to be sound
and complete for entailments in an inductive system S, provided that the set of
constraints of S meets several restrictions. In general, most authors define these
restrictions by the syntax of the logical fragment in which the constraints of the
system are written. In contrast, here we consider a rather general logic, namely
First Order Logic with the canonical Herbrand interpretation, and define the
restrictions necessary for soundness and completeness by a number of decidable
semantic conditions, which can be checked by existing decision procedures. We
then adapt these restrictions to Separation Logic. Additionally, we investigate
the computational complexity of checking whether a given system complies with
these restrictions.
The set of inference rules given in this paper is used by a proof generation
semi-algorithm. Our goal is to describe inference rules and a proof search method
that are general enough so they can be adapted to other types of logic. We
provide a prototype implementation of this semi-algorithm [Ser17], that uses a
variant of the inference rules adjusted for proving entailments between inductive
predicates written in Separation Logic [Rey02].
Related Work The problem of generating cyclic proofs for entailments be-
tween inductively defined predicates in First Order Logic has been considered
by Brotherston, who gave a first sound proof system [Bro05], based on Gentzen-
style natural deduction. There soundness requires that each infinite trace in the
proof goes through infinitely many progress points (left unfoldings), which can
be reduced to an inclusion between Bu¨chi ω-automata. In our case, the require-
ment that the pivot (companion) of an infinite descent rule is placed on the
path from the root to the consequent (bud) is instrumental in giving a sufficient
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local progress condition that can be checked easily. Completeness in [Bro05] is
relative to proofs using an induction rule and uses a cut rule for the introduc-
tion of inductive invariants. In our case, completeness is subject to a number
of (decidable) semantic requirements on the set of constraints of the inductive
system.
Brotherston and Simpson[BS11] describe the proof system CLKIDω, in which
the inductive arguments are discovered during proof construction. The CLKIDω
system is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. Henkin models. Soundness
is guaranteed by a global trace condition ensuring that each infinite trace vis-
its infinitely many progress points, while relative completeness is established
by translation of proofs written using Martin-Lo¨f’s complete induction system,
called LKID, into CLKIDω proofs. Furthermore, the equivalence of LKID and
CLKIDω is conjectured, but left as an open question. More recently, Berardi and
Tatsuta [BT17] have disproved the equivalence by providing a statement, called
2-Hydra, expressed by means of first-order logic with the constant 0, the succes-
sor function, the natural number predicate and an additional binary predicate,
and showing how it is provable in CLKIDω, but not in LKID.
The relation between cyclic proof systems and automata is long-standing,
one of the main results being a complete proof system for the modal µ-calculus
proposed by Walukiewicz [Wal00]. Rosu et al. [RSCM13] also describe reachabil-
ity logic, a framework tailored towards reasoning about reachability properties
of systems. A proof system containing a circularity rule is presented. Similarly
to proofs using infinite descent, a claim holds if it can be proved using itself as a
circularity, and requiring progress before circularities are used ensures soundness.
[GM17] present a labeled sequent calculus that supports arbitrary inductive
predicates, with Separation Logic constraints using the separating implication
connective [Rey02]. To our knowledge this is the first proof system that supports
all connectives of Separation Logic, but unfortunately, no proof of completeness
is provided. We chose not to include the separating implication (magic wand)
in our systems because the Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey fragment of Separation
Logic with this connective appears to be undecidable [RIS17], which prevents us
from effectively checking our sufficient conditions for completeness.
[CJT15] propose a proof system for Separation Logic that extends the basic
cyclic proof method with a cut rule type that uses previously encountered se-
quents as inductive hypothesis and applies them by matching and replacing the
left with the right-hand side of such a hypothesis. This method can prove entail-
ments between predicates whose coverage trees differ, but again, only soundness
is guaranteed. It remains an open question for which class of entailment problems
this type of cut rules yields a complete proof system. An automata-based deci-
sion procedure that tackles such entailments is given in [IRV14]. This method
translates the entailment problem to a language inclusion between tree automata
and uses a closure operation on automata to match divergent predicates. Un-
like proof search, this method uses existing tree automata inclusion algorithms,
which do not produce proof witnesses.
3
In a different vein, [ESW15] give a proof system that uses automatic gen-
eration of concatenation lemmas for inductively defined Separation Logic pred-
icates. Their system is sound and moreover, most concatenation lemmas can
be shown to have a cyclic proof in our system, whereas completeness remains
still an open question. Further, [TLKC16] describes mutual explicit induction
proofs, an induction method based on a well-founded order on Separation Logic
models. Akin to [ESW15], this method considers symbolic heaps extended with
constraints on the data values stored within the heap structures. In a similar
fashion with [CJT15], they keep a vault with hypotheses, which are marked as
valid or unknown. Valid hypotheses can be freely applied, but unknown hypothe-
ses are only applied if certain side conditions, which ensure a decrease in the size
of the heap model, are satisfied. This approach allows the hypotheses to be used
anywhere in the proof tree, and are not restricted to the branch from which they
originated. This method is sound but no completeness arguments are given.
2 Preliminaries
For two integers 0 ≤ i ≤ j, we denote by [i, j] the set {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} and by
[i] the set [1, i], where [0] is the empty set. Given a finite set S, ||S|| denotes its
cardinality, P(S) the powerset and Pfin(S) the set of finite subsets of S.
A signature Σ = (Σs, Σf) consists of a set Σs of sort symbols and a set Σf
of function symbols fσ1···σnσ, where n ≥ 0 is its arity, σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σs are the
sorts of its arguments and σ ∈ Σs is the sort of its result. If n = 0, we call fσ a
constant symbol. We assume that every signature contains the boolean sort, and
write ⊤ and ⊥ for the boolean constants true and false. Let Var be a countable
set of first-order variables, each variable xσ ∈ Var having an associated sort σ.
We omit specifying the sorts of the function symbols and variables, whenever
they are not important. We write x,y, . . . for both sets and ordered tuples of
variables, when no confusion arises.
Terms are defined recursively: any constant symbol or variable is a term, and
if t1, . . . , tn are terms of sorts σ1, . . . , σn, respectively, and f
σ1···σnσ ∈ Σf , then
t = f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term of sort σ, denoted t
σ. We denote by TΣ(x) the set
of terms with function symbols in Σf and variables in x, and we write TΣ for
the set TΣ(∅) of ground terms, in which no variable occurs. Given ground terms
u, t ∈ TΣ , we denote by u ⊑ t the fact that u is a subterm of t. Observe that
(TΣ ,⊑) is a wfqo, because TΣ consists of finite trees only.
Formulae are also defined recursively: a term of boolean sort, an equality
t ≈ u (where t and u are terms of the same sort) are formulae, and a quantified
boolean combination of formulae is a formula. For a formula φ (set of formulae
F ), we denote by FV(φ) (
⋃
φ∈F FV(φ)) the set of variables not occurring under
a quantifier scope, and φ(x) (F (x)) means that x ⊆ FV(φ) (x ⊆
⋃
φ∈F FV(φ)).
The size of a formula is the total number of variables, function symbols and
logical connectives occurring in it.
Given sets of variables x and y, a substitution θ : x → TΣ(y) is a mapping
of the variables in x to terms in TΣ(y). For a set of variables x we denote by
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xθ = {θ(x) | x ∈ x} its image under the substitution θ. A substitution θ is flat
if Varθ ⊆ Var, i.e. each variable is mapped to a variable. For a formula φ(x), we
denote by φθ the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of x ∈ x with
the term θ(x), and lift this notation to sets as Fθ = {φθ | φ ∈ F}. Observe that
θ is always a surjective mapping between FV(φ) and FV(φθ).
An interpretation I maps each sort symbol σ ∈ Σs to a non-empty set σI ,
each function symbol fσ1...σnσ ∈ Σ to a total function fI : σI1 × . . .× σ
I
n → σ
I
where n > 0, and to an element of σI when n = 0. A distinguished example is the
Herbrand (canonical) interpretation H, which maps each sort σ ∈ Σs into TΣ ,
each constant symbol c into the term c and each function symbol fσ1...σnσ into
the function carrying the tuple of terms tσ11 , . . . , t
σn
n into the term f(t1, . . . , tn).
Given an interpretation I, a valuation ν maps each variable xσ ∈ Var to
an element of σI . Given a tuple of variables x = (x1, . . . , xk), we write ν(x)
for (ν(x1), . . . , ν(xk)). For a term t, t
I
ν is the value obtained by replacing each
function symbol f by its interpretation fI and each variable x by its valuation
ν(x). For a quantifier-free formula φ, we write I, ν |= φ if the formula obtained
by replacing each term t in φ by the value tIν is equivalent to true. The semantics
of first order quantifiers is defined as: I, ν |= ∃xσ . φ(x) iff I, ν[x ← α] |= φ, for
some value α ∈ σI , where ν[x← α] is the same as ν, except for ν[x← α](x) = α.
A formula φ is satisfiable in the interpretation I if there exists a valuation
ν such that I, ν |= φ. Given formulae φ and ψ, we say that φ entails ψ in
the interpretation I, denoted φ |=I ψ, iff I, ν |= φ implies I, ν |= ψ, for each
valuation ν.
2.1 Systems of Inductive Definitions
Let Pred be a countable set of predicates, each pσ1...σn ∈ Pred having an as-
sociated tuple of argument sorts. Given pσ1...σn ∈ Pred and a tuple of terms
(tσ11 , . . . , t
σn
n ), we call p(t1, . . . , tn) a predicate atom. A predicate rule is a pair
〈{φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn)}, p(x)〉, where x,x1, . . . ,xn are pairwise dis-
joint sets of variables, φ is a formula, called the constraint, p(x) is a predicate
atom called the goal and q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn) are predicate atoms called subgoals.
The variables x are the goal variables, whereas the ones in
⋃n
i=1 xi are the subgoal
variables of the rule.
An inductive system S (system, for short) is a finite set of predicate rules. We
assume w.l.o.g. that there are no goals with the same predicate and different goal
variables, and write p(x)←S R1 | . . . | Rm when {〈R1, p(x)〉 , . . . , 〈Rm, p(x)〉} is
the set of all predicate rules in S with goal p(x). The size of S is the sum of the
sizes of all constraints occurring in the rules of S.
We assume that each constraint is a quantifier-free formula in which no dis-
junction occurs positively and no conjunction occurs negatively and, moreover,
that the set of constraints of a system has a decidable satisfiability problem.
Observe that disjunctions can be eliminated w.l.o.g. from quantifier-free con-
straints, by splitting each rule 〈{φ1 ∨ . . .∨φm, q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn)}, p(x)〉 into m
rules 〈{φi, q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn)} , p(x)〉, one for each i ∈ [m]. Finally, we assume
that each predicate p ∈ Pred is the goal of at least one rule of S.
5
Example 1. Consider the following inductive system of predicates:
p(x) ←S x ≈ f(x1, x2), p1(x1), p2(x2) q(x) ←S x ≈ f(x1, x2), q1(x1), q2(x2)
p1(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), p1(x1) | x ≈ a | x ≈ f(x1, x2), q2(x1), q1(x2)
p2(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), p2(x1) | x ≈ b q1(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), q1(x1) | x ≈ a
q2(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), q2(x1) | x ≈ b
Intuitively, S models two tree automata with final states given by the predicates
p and q, where p accepts trees of the form f(gm(a), gn(b)), while q accepts trees
of the form f(gm(a), gn(b)) and f(gm(b), gn(a)), where m,n ≤ 0. ⊓⊔
Given an inductive system S and an interpretation I, an assignment X
maps each predicate pσ1...σn ∈ Pred to a set X (p) ⊆ σI1 × . . . × σ
I
n . By a
slight abuse of notation, we lift assignments from predicates to a set F =
{φ, q1(x1), . . . , qm(xm)}, where φ is a first order formula and qi(xi) are pred-
icate atoms, we define X (
∧
F ) = {ν | I, ν |= φ, ν(xi) ∈ X (qi), ∀i ∈ [m]}.
The system S and interpretation I induce a function FIS(X ) on assignments,
which maps each predicate p ∈ Pred into the set
⋃m
i=1{ν(x) | ν ∈ X (
∧
Ri)},
where p(x) ←S R1 | . . . | Rm and, for a tuple of variables x = (x1, . . . , xk), we
write ν(x) for (ν(x1), . . . , ν(xk)). A solution of S is an assignment X such that
FIS(X ) ⊆ X , where inclusion between assignments is defined pointwise. It can
easily be shown that the set of all assignments, together with the ⊆ relation,
is a complete lattice, since any power set equipped with the subset relation is
a complete lattice. Because FIS is monotone, it follows from Tarski’s theorem
[Tar55] that µSI =
⋂
{X | FIS(X ) ⊆ X} is the least fixed point of F
I
S and the
least solution of S.
Note that predicates p ∈ Pred that are not the goal of any predicate rule in
an inductive system S will have empty least solutions, i.e. µSI(p) = ∅, thus each
predicate rule containing such a predicate as a subgoal can be safely removed
from the system. This justifies our earlier assumption that each predicate p ∈
Pred is the goal of at least one predicate rule of S.
Example 2. For the inductive system in Example 1:
µSI(p) = {f(gn(a), gm(b)) | n,m ≥ 0}
µSI(p1) = µSI(q1) = {gn(a) | n ≥ 0}
µSI(p2) = µSI(q2) = {gn(b) | n ≥ 0}
µSI(q) = {f(gn(a), gm(b)) | n,m ≥ 0} ∪ {f(gn(b), gm(a)) | n,m ≥ 0}
Since µSI(p) ⊆ µSI(q), it follows that the entailment p |=IS q holds. In other
words, the language accepted by the state represented as the predicate p is
included in the language of the state represented by q.
We are concerned with the following entailment problem: given an inductive
system S, an interpretation I, and predicates pσ1...σm , qσ1...σm1 , . . . , q
σ1...σm
n , hav-
ing the same tuple of argument sorts, is it true that µSI(p) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 µS
I(qi)?
We denote entailment problems as p |=IS q1, . . . , qn.
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2.2 Well Quasi-Orders
Given a set D, a quasi-order (qo) is a reflexive and transitive relation  ⊆
D × D. An infinite sequence d1, d2, . . . from D is saturating if di  dj for some
i < j. A quasi-order  is a well-quasi-order (wqo) if every infinite sequence
is saturating. A quasi-order  is well-founded (wfqo) iff there are no infinite
decreasing sequences d1 ≻ d2 ≻ . . . Every wqo is well-founded, but not viceversa.
We extend any wqo (D,) to the following order on the set of finite subsets
of D. For all finite sets S, T ∈ Pfin(D), we have S ∀∃ T if and only if for all a ∈ S
there exists b ∈ T such that a  b. The following is a consequence of Higman’s
Lemma [Hig52]:
Lemma 1. If D is countable and (D,) is a wqo, then (Pfin(D),
∀∃) is a wqo.
A multiset over D is a mapping M : D → N. The multiset M is finite if
M(d) > 0 for a finite number of elements d ∈ D. We denote by M(D) the set
of finite multisets over D, and lift the operations of subset, union, intersection
and difference to multisets, as usual. The multiset order induced by  is defined
as in [DM79]. We write N † M if and only if either M = N , or there exists
a non-empty finite multiset X ⊆ M and a (possibly empty) multiset Y , where
for all y ∈ Y there exists x ∈ X such that y ≺ x and N = (M \ X) ∪ Y .
Roughly, N is obtained by replacing a non-empty submultiset of M with a
possibly empty multiset of strictly smaller elements. The following theorem was
proved in [DM79]:
Theorem 1. (M(D),†) is a wfqo if and only if (D,) is a wfqo.
2.3 Canonical Interpretation
Let N∗ be the set of sequences of natural numbers, ε ∈ N∗ be the empty sequence,
and p · q denote the concatenation of two sequences p, q ∈ N∗. We say that p is
a prefix of q iff p · r = q, for some r ∈ N∗. A set X ⊆ N∗ is prefix-closed if p ∈ X
implies that every prefix of p is in X . A tree over the signature Σ = (Σs, Σf) is
a ground term t ∈ TΣ , viewed as a finite partial function t : N∗ ⇀fin Σf , where
dom(t) is prefix-closed and, for all α ∈ dom(t) such that t(α) = fσ1...σnσ, we have
{i ∈ N | pi ∈ dom(t)} = [n]. We denote by fr(t) = {α ∈ dom(t) | α · 1 6∈ dom(t)}
the frontier of t. Given a tree t and a position α ∈ dom(t), we denote by t|α the
subtree of t rooted at α, where, for each β ∈ N∗, we have t|α(β) = t(α · β). The
subtree order is defined by u ⊑ t iff u = t|α , for some α ∈ dom(t). It is easy
to see that (TΣ ,⊑) is a wfqo, because TΣ consists only of finite trees, making it
impossible to build an infinite strictly decreasing sequence of subtrees.
For a function symbol fσ1...σn ∈ Σf and trees t1, . . . , tn ∈ TΣ , let τn(f, t1, . . . , tn)
be the tree t such that t(ε) = f and t|i = ti, for all i ∈ [n]. The Herbrand
(canonical) interpretation H maps each sort σ ∈ Σs into TΣ , each constant sym-
bol c into the tree cH = {(ε, c)} consisting of a leaf which is also the root, and
each function symbol fσ1...σnσ into the function fH mapping each tuple of trees
t1, . . . , tn into τn(f, t1, . . . , tn). Even in this simple case, where function symbols
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do not have any equational properties (e.g. commutativity, associativity, etc.)
entailment problems are undecidable, as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The entailment problem is undecidable for First Order Logic, un-
der the Herbrand interpretation.
This negative result excludes the possibility of having a complete proof sys-
tem for solving entailments between predicates of inductive systems using (un-
restricted) first-order logic constraints, under the canonical interpretation. A
possible workaround is to restrict the class of systems considered, by imposing
several semantic restrictions on the set of constraints that occur within the rules
of the system (§3.4).
3 Cyclic Proofs for Inductive Predicate Entailments
In this section we present our set of inference rules (proof system) for proving
entailments between predicates in a given inductive system. In a nutshell, our
proof system is based on a classical unfold-and-match scheme, extended with a
split rule (explained next), and whose termination relies on an infinite descent
inductive argument. The proof system is inspired by an antichain-based language
inclusion algorithm for top-down tree automata [HLSV11], briefly explained in
§3.1. The presentation of the inference rules uses a comparison with the internals
of the language inclusion algorithm. Because, moreover, language inclusion is de-
cidable for tree automata, we extract several sufficient conditions that guarantee
completeness of the proof system, and thus the existence of a decision procedure
for the entailment problem.
3.1 Tree Automata Inclusion as Cyclic Proof Search
We assume basic knowledge of tree automata [CDG+05] and consider top-down
nondeterministic finite tree automata (NFTA), whose actions are described by
transition rules q
f
−→ (q1, . . . , qn), with the following meaning: if the automaton
is in state q and the input is a ground term f(t1, . . . , tn), then it moves simul-
taneously on each ti changing its state to qi, for all i ∈ [n]. A ground term is
accepted by an automaton A in state q if each constant subterm (leaf) can be
eventually read by a rule of the form q
a
−→ (). The language of a state q in A,
denoted L(A, q), is the set of ground terms accepted by A starting with q.
An NFTA can be naturally viewed as an inductive system, where predicates
represent states and predicate rules are obtained directly from transition rules,
as follows. For instance, the transition rule q
f
−→ (q1, . . . , qn) can be written
as 〈{x ≈ f(x1, . . . , xn), q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn)}, q(x)〉, where variables range over
ground terms and the function symbols are interpreted in the canonical (Her-
brand) sense. Then L(A, q) = µSH(q), for any state (predicate) q. Then a lan-
guage inclusion problem L(A, p) ⊆
⋃k
i=1 L(A, qi) is equivalent to the entailment
problem p |=HS q1, . . . , qk, where S is the inductive system corresponding to A.
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Example 3. Consider the following inductive system:
p(x) ←S x ≈ f(x1, x2), p1(x1), p2(x2) q(x) ←S x ≈ f(x1, x2), q1(x1), q2(x2)
p1(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), p1(x1) | x ≈ a | x ≈ f(x1, x2), q2(x1), q1(x2)
p2(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), p2(x1) | x ≈ b q1(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), q1(x1) | x ≈ a
q2(x)←S x ≈ g(x1), q2(x1) | x ≈ b
Intuitively, p accepts terms of the form f(gn(a), gm(b)) and q accepts both terms
of the form f(gn(a), gm(b)) and f(gn(b), gm(a)) with n,m ≥ 0. Then p |=HS q
holds, while q 6|=HS p. 
Since language inclusion is decidable for NFTA1, we leverage from an existing
algorithm for this problem by Hol´ık et al. [HLSV11] to build a complete set of
inference rules and derive a proof search technique. This algorithm searches for
counterexamples of the inclusion problem L(A, p) ⊆
⋃k
i=1 L(A, qi) by enumerat-
ing pairs (r, {s1, . . . , sm}), where r is a state that can be reached via a series of
transitions from p, and {s1, . . . , sm} are all the states that can be reached via the
same series of transitions from q1, . . . , qk. A counterexample is found when the
algorithm encounters a pair (r, {s1, . . . , sm}) such that there exists a transition
r
a
→ (), but there is no transition si
a
→ () for any i ∈ [m].
Example 4. If A is the NFTA equivalent to the system from Example 3, to check
L(A, p) ⊆ L(A, q), we start with (p, {q}). A possible run of the algorithm is:
(p, {q})
((p1, p2), {(q1, q2), (q2, q1)})
(p1, {q1, q2}) (p1, {q1}) (p2, {q2}) (p2, {q2, q1})
((), {()}) (p1, {q1, q2}) ((), {()}) (p1, {q1}) ((), {()}) (p2, {q2}) ((), {()}) (p2, {q2, q1})
f
a g a g b g b g
The algorithm performs two types of moves: transitions and split actions. The
arrows labeled by function symbols f, g, a and b are transitions, for instance
the arrow labeled by f takes p into the tuple (p1, p2) by the transition rule
p
f
−→ (p1, p2) and {q} into the set of tuples {(q1, q2), (q2, q1)}, corresponding
to the transition rules q
f
−→ (q1, q2) and q
f
−→ (q2, q1). However the pair of tu-
ples ((p1, p2), {(q1, q2), (q2, q1)}) is problematic because it asserts the following:
L(A, p1)×L(A, p2) ⊆ L(A, q1)×L(A, q2)∪L(A, q2)×L(A, q1). Using several prop-
erties of the Cartesian product2 this proof obligation can be split into several con-
junctive subgoals. The split move used above corresponds to considering simulta-
neously the pairs (p1, {q1, q2}), (p1, {q1}), (p2, {q2}) and (p2, {q2, q1}), asserting
that L(A, p1) ⊆ L(A, q1) and L(A, p2) ⊆ L(A, q2). The other possibilities are:
1 See, e.g. [CDG+05, Corollary 1.7.9].
2 See [HLSV11, Theorem 1].
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(1) {(p1, {q1, q2}), (p1, {q1}), (p1, {q2}), (p2, {q2, q1})}, (2) {(p1, {q1, q2}), (p2, {q1}),
(p1, {q2}), (p2, {q2, q1})} and (3) {(p1, {q1, q2}), (p2, {q1}), (p2, {q2}), (p2, {q2, q1})}.
The algorithm does not further expand nodes ((), S) with () ∈ S, for which in-
clusion holds trivially, or (p, S) which has a predecessor (p, S′) such that S′ ⊆ S
(enclosed in dashed boxes). In the latter case, any counterexample that can be
found from (p, S) could have been discovered from (p, S′). 
3.2 A Proof Search Semi-algorithm
In this section we give a set of inference rules for proving the validity of en-
tailments between predicates defined in an inductive system. We describe the
inference rules using a Gentzen-style sequent calculus.
(R)
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 . . . Γn ⊢ ∆n
Γ ⊢ ∆
side
conditions
.... C
Γp ⊢ ∆p
We denote sequents as Γ ⊢ ∆, where
Γ and ∆ are sets of formulae. The com-
mas in the sequents are read as set union,
thus contraction rules are not necessary. A
singleton {p(x)} is denoted as p(x), and a
sequent of the form p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) is said to be basic. An inference rule
r has #(r) ≥ 0 antecedents Γi ⊢ ∆i, for i = 1, . . . ,#(r) and a consequent Γ ⊢ ∆.
We denote an empty antecedent list of an inference rule by ⊤.
Additionally, certain inference rules with no antecedents may have a pivot
Γp ⊢ ∆p, which is always a predecessor of the consequent in the transitive
closure of the consequent-antecedent relation. The path between the pivot and
the consequent is subject to a pivot constraint, defined next.
For conciseness of presentation, we refer to inference rule schemata R, that
are possibly infinite sets of inference rules sharing the same pattern. Without
entering formal details, we assume that checking whether a given inference rule
instance belongs to a given schema is straightforward and that there are finitely
many instances of a certain schema for a given pivot and consequent.
Definition 1. A derivation is a possibly infinite tree D = (V, v0, S, R, P ), where
V is a set of vertices, v0 ∈ V is the root node, and for each vertex v ∈ V , S(v)
is a sequent, R(v) is a rule schema labeling v and, if v 6= v0, then P (v) is the
parent of v. In particular, for each v ∈ V \ {v0}, S(v) is an antecedent of an
instance of R(P (v)), with consequent P (v). A proof is a finite derivation.
Observe that, by this definition, the antecedent list of each terminal (leaf)
node in a proof is necessarily empty and, since the branching degree of a proof
is finite, each path in the proof must be finite, by Ko¨nig’s Lemma. Below we
define (possibly infinite) traces, by considering the continuation of a path via a
backlink from the consequent to the pivot of a rule.
Definition 2. Given a derivation D = (V, v0, S, R, P ), a backlink is a pair
(u, v) with u, v ∈ V such that v is the pivot of the instance of R(u) applied at
u. A trace is a sequence of vertices τ = v1, v2, . . . such that, for all i ≥ 2, either
vi−1 = P (vi) or (vi−1, vi) is a backlink. A path of τ is any finite subsequence
π = vi, . . . , vj such that i < j and vk−1 = P (vk), for all k ∈ [i + 1, j]. If,
moreover, (vj , vi) is a backlink, then π is a direct path.
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Additionally, if D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) is a derivation and τ = v1, v2, . . . is a
trace in D, we say that τ contains a backlink if there exists a position i > 1
such that (vi−1, vi) is a backlink. Given a path or a finite trace π = v1, . . . , vk
with k ≥ 2, we denote by Λ(π) the sequence R(v1), . . . , R(vk−1) of inference rule
schemata that are applied on π.
The pivot constraint C of a rule schema R is a set of finite sequences of rule
schemata, such that, for any instance r of R, if π is the direct path from the
pivot of r to its consequent in any derivation, then Λ(π) ∈ C.
Proposition 1. Given a proof D, any infinite trace of D contains infinitely
many direct paths.
Given a system S, an interpretation I and a set of predicates pσ1,...,σn ,
q
σ1,...,σn
1 , . . ., q
σ1,...,σn
k ∈ Pred, a set of inference rule schemata R is: (i) sound if,
for any proof D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) with S(v0) = p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x), we have
p |=IS q1, . . . , qn, (ii) complete if p |=
I
S q1, . . . , qn implies the existence of a proof
D = (V, v0, s, r, p), where S(v0) = p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x).
A strategy is a set of sequences S of inference rule schemata. A sequence s is
a valid prefix for S if s · s′ ∈ S for another sequence s′. A derivation D (proof) is
an S-derivation (S-proof) if the sequence of inference rules along each maximal
path of D belongs to S.
Given an input sequent p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x), a set R of inference rules
and a strategy S, the proof search semi-algorithm (1) uses a worklist iteration to
build a derivation of p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x). When a sequent is removed from
the worklist, it chooses (non-deterministically) an inference rule and an instance
whose consequent matches the current sequent, if one exists. In order to speed
up termination, the nodes matching a rule with zero antecedents are considered
eagerly (line 8). It is manifest that, if a proof of the input sequent exists, then
there exists a finite execution of the semi-algorithm (1) leading to it.
3.3 Inference Rules
Figure 1 gives a set RId of inference rule schemata for the entailment problem.
To shorten the presentation, we write 〈Γi ⊢ ∆i〉
n
i=1 for Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, . . . , Γn ⊢ ∆n.
The inference rules (LU) and (RU) correspond to the unfolding of a predicate
atom p(x) occurring on the left- and right-hand side of a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, respec-
tively. By unfolding, we mean the replacement of p(x) with the set of predicate
rules in p(x) ←S R1 | . . . | Rn. Observe that the left unfolding yields a set of
sequents for each Ri that must be all proved, whereas the right unfolding simply
replaces p(x), on the right-hand side of the sequent, with a set of formulae in
which the subgoal variables of R1, . . . , Rn are existentially quantified.
The inference rules (RD) eliminate the constraints from both the left- and
right-hand sides. The existentially quantified variables on the right-hand side are
eliminated using a finite set of substitutions that witness the entailments between
the left and right constraints. Since (RD) can create conjunctions of predicates
with the same arguments, we assume that every application of (RD) is followed
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Algorithm 1 Proof search semi-algorithm.
data structure: Node(Seq ,CList ,Parent ,Rule), where:
– Seq is the sequent that labels the node,
– CList is the list of children nodes,
– Parent is the link to the parent of the node,
– Rule is the inference rule with consequent Seq .
input:
– an inductive system S ,
– a sequent p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x),
– a set R of inference rule schemata and a strategy S
output: a proof D = (V, v0, S,R,P ) such that S(v0) = p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x)
1: Root← Node(p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x), [], nil , nil)
2: WorkList← {Root}
3: while WorkList 6= ∅ do
4: remove N from WorkList and match it with Node(Γ ⊢ ∆,CList , P, R)
5: let π be the path between Root and N
6: let RN ⊆ R be the inference rule schemata applicable on N.Seq and π
7: let R0N ⊆ RN be the subset of RN with empty antecedent lists
8: if Λ(π) · R is a valid prefix of S for some R ∈ R0N then
9: N.Rule ← R
10: mark N as closed
11: if N not closed and Λ(π) · R is a valid prefix of S for some R ∈ RN then
12: let r be an instance of R such that N.Seq is the consequent of r
13: for each antecedent Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ of r do
14: N ′ ← Node(Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′, [], N,nil)
15: Append N ′ to N.CList
16: Append N ′ to WorkList
17: if N.CList is empty then mark N as closed
by a cleanup of the right-hand side of its antecedent(s) using a weakening rule
(∧R) until all such conjunctions of predicates are eliminated.
In the case of tree automata language inclusion checking, the (LU), (RU)
and (RD) rules are taken all at once, by a transition move of the language
inclusion algorithm of [HLSV11] (Example 4). This is natural because the tran-
sition rules (predicate rules) of tree automata are controlled uniquely by the
function symbols labeling the root of the current input term. Because function
symbols can only be compared via equality, the constraints within the pred-
icate rules of a tree automata match unambiguously. For instance, we have
x ≈ f(x1, x2) |=H ∃y1∃y2 . x ≈ g(y1, y2) if and only if f and g are the same
function symbol, in which case the only substitution witnessing the validity of
the entailment is θ(xi) = yi, for i = 1, 2.
However, when considering general constraints, matching amounts to discov-
ering non-trivial substitutions that prove an entailment between existentially
quantified formulae in the logic in which the constraints are written. Moreover,
the matching step implemented by the (RD) rule is crucial for proving complete-
ness of the set of inference rules, by generalizing from the simple case of tree
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(LU)
〈Ri(x,yi), Γ \ p(x) ⊢ ∆〉
n
i=1
Γ ⊢ ∆
p(x)∈Γ , p(x)←SR1(x,y1)|...|Rn(x,yn)
y1,...,yn fresh variables
(RU)
Γ ⊢ {∃yi .
∧
Ri(x,yi)}
n
i=1 ,∆ \ p(x)
Γ ⊢ ∆
p(x)∈∆, p(x)←SR1(x,y1)|...|Rn(x,yn)
y1,...,yn fresh variables
(RD)
p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}
i
j=1
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {∃yj . ψj(x,yj) ∧ Qj(yj)}
k
j=1
φ|=I
∧i
j=1 ∃yj .ψj
φ 6|=I
∨k
j=i+1 ∃yj .ψj
Sj⊆Sk(φ,ψj),j∈[i]
(∧R)
Γ ⊢ p(x) ∧Q,∆ Γ ⊢ q(x) ∧Q,∆
Γ ⊢ p(x) ∧ q(x) ∧Q,∆
(AX) ⊤
Γ ⊢ ∆
∧
Γ |=I
∨
∆
(ID)
⊤
Γθ ⊢ ∆′θ
θ flat injective
substitution
∆ ⊆ ∆′
.... R
∗
Id·LU·R
∗
Id
Γ ⊢ ∆
(SP)
〈pı¯j (x) ⊢ {q
ℓ
ı¯j
(x) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j}〉
nk
j=1
p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ Q1(x1, . . . ,xn), . . . ,Qk(x1, . . . ,xn)
∀i,j∈[n] . xi∩xj=∅, ı¯∈[n]
nk
Qi=
∧n
j=1 q
i
j (xj),Qi=〈q
i
1,...,q
i
n〉
F(Q1,...,Qk)={f1,...,fnk}
Fig. 1. The set RId of inference rule schemata for inductive entailments.
automata constraints and discovering general properties of the set of constraints
that allow matching to be complete. Such properties are detailed in §3.4.
We introduce a set of universal predicate rules Suniv = {〈{⊤}, pku(x1, . . . , xk)〉 |
k ≥ 0} and assume that any system S contains it by default. If, after the cleanup
done by applying (∧R), there are conjunctions of predicates Q on the right hand
side such that there exist sets of subgoals xi for which ∃p ∈ S . p(xi) ∈ Γ , but
∀q ∈ S . q(xi) 6∈ Q, then we add p
||xi||
u (xi) to Q. While not changing the semantics
of the entailment, this makes sure that, after every application of (RD), there
always are the same number of predicates on the left hand side and in every set
of predicate conjunctions on the right hand side, thus enabling the application
of (SP).
The (SP) rules break up a sequent without constraints, of the form p1(x1), . . . ,
pn(xn) ⊢
∧n
j=1 q
1
j (xj), . . . ,
∧n
j=1 q
k
j (xj), into n basic sequents, with left-hand
sides p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn), respectively. Given a set of tuples {Q1, . . . ,Qk} ⊆
Predn, for some n ≥ 1, a choice function f maps each tuple Qi into an index
f(Qi) ∈ [n] corresponding to a given coordinate in the tuple. Let F(Q1, . . . ,Qk)
be the set of such choice functions. This set has cardinality nk ≤ n||Pred||
n
, for any
set of n-tuples of predicates. Observe that (SP) is applied to each tuple ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
of choices, indexed by the set of choice functions. Intuitively, the (SP) infer-
ence rules correspond to the split moves of the tree automata language inclusion
algorithm (Example 4).
The rules (AX) close the current branch of the proof if the sequent can be
proved using a decision procedure for the underlying constraint logic, by possibly
treating predicate symbols as uninterpreted boolean functions. In the case of tree
automata, this is similar to the matching of constant symbols that leads to pairs
with empty left-hand sides (Example 4).
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Finally, let us explain the infinite descent rules (ID), which are the only
rules to introduce backlinks in a proof, from the consequent vertex labeled
with a sequent Γθ ⊢ ∆′θ to a predecessor (pivot) vertex labeled with Γ ⊢ ∆.
The condition R∗Id · LU · R
∗
Id requires that a vertex labeled with a rule (LU)
must occur on the direct path between the pivot and the consequent. The
soundness of (ID) rules is based on the following argument. Assuming that the
consequent Γθ ⊢ ∆′θ denotes a non-valid entailment, there exists a valuation
ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γθ) \ µSI(
∨
∆′θ) which contradicts the entailment. Then, because
θ is an injective substitution, the restriction of θ to FV(Γ ∪∆′) has an inverse
and, because moreover ∆′ ⊆ ∆, we obtain that ν′ = ν ◦ θ−1 is a counterexample
for the pivot sequent, i.e. ν′ ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI(
∨
∆). By the local soundness
of the rules in RId \ {ID} we deduce that there exists a path in the proof, on
which this counterexample can be propagated downwards. But this path may
not encounter a leaf labeled (AX), because this would violate its side condition,
and can be potentially extended to an infinite trace. However, then we could also
propagate the counterexample along a trace with an infinite number of direct
paths (Proposition 1). Since (LU) must occur on each direct path, by the pivot
condition, we use an additional ranking assumption (Definition 4) to show that
no infinite decreasing sequence of counterexamples exists, hence there was no
counterexample to begin with.
In analogy with tree automata, the language inclusion algorithm of [HLSV11]
stops expanding a branch in the search tree whenever it has discovered a pair
(p, S′) that has a predecessor (p, S), with S ⊆ S′. Just as for the (ID) inference
rules, backtracking relies on the Infinite Descent principle [Bus18], that forbids
infinitely descending sequences of counterexamples.
Example 5. Considering the inductive system from Example 3, we can use RId
to build the following proof for the sequent p(x) ⊢ q(x):
p1(x) ⊢ q1(x), q2(x)
x ≈ a ⊢ q1(x), q2(x)
x ≈ a ⊢ x ≈ a,∃y1 . x ≈ g(y1) ∧ q1(y1), q2(x)
⊤
x ≈ g(x1), p1(x1) ⊢ q1(x), q2(x)
x ≈ g(x1), p1(x1) ⊢ x ≈ a,∃y1 . x ≈ g(y) ∧ q1(y1), q2(x)
x ≈ g(x1), p1(x1)⊢x ≈ a,∃y1 . x ≈ g(y1) ∧ q1(y1),
x ≈ b,∃y1 . x ≈ g(y1) ∧ q2(y1)
p1(x) ⊢ q1(x), q2(x)
⊤
LU
RU
AX
RU
RU
RD
ID
p(x) ⊢ q(x)
x ≈ f(x1, x2), p1(x1), p2(x2) ⊢ q(x)
x ≈ f(x1, x2), p1(x1), p2(x2)⊢∃y1, y2 . x ≈ f(y1, y2) ∧ q1(y1) ∧ q2(y2),
∃y1, y2 . x ≈ f(y1, y2) ∧ q2(y1) ∧ q1(y2)
p1(x1), p2(x2) ⊢ q1(x1) ∧ q2(x2), q2(x1) ∧ q1(x2)
p1(x) ⊢ q1(x), q2(x) p1(x) ⊢ q1(x) p2(x) ⊢ q2(x) p2(x) ⊢ q2(x), q1(x)
lu
ru
rd
sp
The dashed arrow indicates the pivot of the ID rule. For space reasons, some
branches following the application of (SP) are omitted. The full proof is provided
as additional material. ⊓⊔
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3.4 Restricting the Set of Constraints
The following definitions introduce sufficient conditions that ensure the sound-
ness and completeness of the set of inference rules given in §3.3. These definitions
are not bound to a particular logic or interpretation, and will be extended to
logics other than multisorted first-order logic, such as Separation Logic [Rey02]
(§4).
Effectively checking these restrictions for a given system is subject to the
existence of a decision procedure for the ∃∗∀∗ fragment of the logic in which the
constraints are written. Formally, this is the set of prenex normal form sentences
of the form ∃x1 . . . ∃xn∀y1 . . . ∀ym . φ, where φ is quantifier-free. For First Order
Logic with the canonical interpretation, this problem, known as disunification,
has been shown decidable in [CL89], with tighter complexity bounds given in
[Pic03].
The first restriction requires that, given any models for the subgoals of a
predicate rule, it be possible to find an all-encompassing model that also satisfies
the constraint of the rule. This restriction is necessary because lifting it leads,
in general, to the undecidability of the entailment problem, as it is the case for
tree automata with equality and disequality constraints3.
Definition 3. Given an interpretation I, a first order inductive system S is
non-filtering iff, for every 〈{φ, q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn)}, p(x)〉 ∈ S, for all i ∈ [n] and
vi ∈ µSI(qi), there exists a valuation ν such that ν(xi) = vi and I, ν |= φ. An
inductive system is non-filtering if all predicate rules are non-filtering.
Example 6. The system in Example 1 is non-filtering. If we added the rule
〈{x ≈ f(x1, x2) ∧ x1 ≈ x2, p1(x1), p2(x2)} , p(x)〉, we would break this restriction,
because it rejects all subgoals models assigning different values to x1 and x2. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. The problem “Given a first order inductive system S, is S non-
filtering?” is undecidable in the Herbrand interpretation.
Due to this negative result, we adopt a stronger (sufficient) condition, which
requires that ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃x . φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) holds, for each constraint φ in the
system. In the canonical Herbrand interpretation, the latter problem becomes
decidable, because each constraint φ is a conjunction of equalities s ≈ t and dise-
qualities ¬s ≈ t between terms over the variables x∪
⋃n
i=1 xi. Establishing the va-
lidity of ∀x1 . . .∀xn∃x . φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) reduces to checking that ∃x1 . . . ∃xn∀x .
¬φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) is unsatisfiable. Because we assumed that constraints do not
contain disjunctions, ¬φ is a disjunction of equalities and disequalities, thus it
is trivially in conjunctive normal form. Since the satisfiability of the formulae
∃x∀y . φ(x,y), with φ in conjunctive normal form, is NP-complete4, our validity
problem is in co-NP.
The second restriction guarantees that the principle of Infinite Descent [Bus18]
can be applied to close a branch of the proof tree. We fix an interpretation I
3 See e.g. [CDG+05, Theorem 4.2.10].
4 See [Pic03, Theorem 5.2].
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and assume that (σI ,I,σ) is a wfqo, for each sort σ ∈ Σs. Given a valuation ν
and a set of variables x ⊆ Var, we denote by [[x]]ν the multiset [[ν(x) | x ∈ x]].
For two multisets [[x]]ν and [[y]]µ, where ν and µ are two valuations, we write
[[x]]ν 
∀∃
I [[y]]µ (respectively [[x]]ν ≺
∀∃
I [[y]]µ) iff for each variable x
σ ∈ x there
exists a variable yσ ∈ y, of the same sort σ, such that ν(x) I,σ µ(y) (respec-
tively ν(x) ≺I,σ µ(y)). It is easy to see that, in every chain [[x1]]ν1 ∼ [[x2]]ν2 ∼
. . . ∼ [[xk]]νk , where ∼ is either 
∀∃
I or ≻
∀∃
I , we have [[x1]]ν1 ≻
∀∃
I [[xk]]νk iff
[[xi]]νi ≻
∀∃
I [[xi+1]]νi+1 for at least some i ∈ [k − 1].
Proposition 2. Given a signature Σ and an interpretation I, let S =
⋃
σ∈Σs σ
I
be the set of values in the interpretation of each sort in Σ. Then (M(S),≺∀∃I )
is a wfqo provided that (σI ,I,σ) is a wfqo, for each σ ∈ Σs.
Definition 4. A first order inductive system S is ranked in the interpreta-
tion I iff, for every constraint φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) in S, with goal variables x and
subgoal variables
⋃n
i=1 xi, and every valuation ν, such that I, ν |= φ, we have
[[
⋃n
i=1 xi]]ν ≺
∀∃
I [[x]]ν .
Example 7. The system from Example 1 is ranked, because the only constraints
involving subgoal variables are(i) x ≈ f(x1, x2) and (ii) x ≈ g(x1) and for each
valuation ν we have ν(x1) ⊑ ν(x) and ν(x2) ⊑ ν(x), if ν satisfies the constraint
(i) and ν(x1) ⊑ ν(x), if ν satisfies the constraint (ii), where ⊑ is the subtree
relation described in §2.3. ⊓⊔
For the Herbrand interpretation, we consider the natural subtree order on
ground terms (TΣ ,⊑) and obtain the following:
Lemma 3. The problem “Given a first order inductive system S, is S ranked
in the Herbrand interpretation” is in co-NP.
Considering again systems whose constraints are interpreted in the canonical
Herbrand interpretation, it is natural to ask whether a given system is ranked in
the subtree order (TΣ ,⊑). Since the satisfiability of the quantifier-free fragment
of the first order logic with a binary relation symbol interpreted as the subterm
relation is an NP-complete problem [Ven87], one can effectively decide if a given
system is ranked. For each constraint φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) we check if the formula
φ ∧
∨
y∈x1∪...∪xn
∧
x∈x (y ≈ x ∨ ¬y ⊑ x) is unsatisfiable, where ⊑ is interpreted
as the subtree order. Since the size of the latter formula is polynomially bounded
in the size of φ, the problem of checking if a given system is ranked is in co-NP.
The third restriction guarantees that all constraints can be eliminated from
a sequent, by instantiating the subgoal variables on the right-hand side using
finitely many substitutions mapping to the subgoal variables from the left-hand
side. Given a sequent Given a sequent φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢
∃y1 . . .∃ym . ψ(x,y1,
. . . ,ym) ∧ q1(y1) ∧ . . . ∧ qm(ym), if the entailment φ |=I ∃y1 . . .∃ym . ψ is valid,
then we can replace it with p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {q1(y1θ) ∧ . . . ∧ qm(ymθ) | θ ∈ S},
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where φ |=I ψθ, for each θ ∈ S. This elimination of constraints from se-
quents is generally sound but incomplete. The above entailment is valid iff
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) |=
I ψ′(x,x1, . . . ,xm), where ψ
′ is obtained from ψ by replacing
each y ∈ y1 ∪ . . . ∪ ym with a Skolem function symbol fy(x,x1, . . . ,xn) not
occurring in φ or ψ5. A complete proof rule based on this replacement has to
consider all possible interpretations of these Skolem witnesses. This is impos-
sible in general, as their definitions are not bound to any particular form. For
completeness, we require that these functions are defined as flat substitutions
ranging over x∪
⋃n
i=1 xi. This condition ensures moreover that there are finitely
many possible interpretations of the Skolem witnesses.
Definition 5. An inductive system S has the finite instantiation property iff for
any two constraints φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) and ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) from S, with goal vari-
ables x and subgoal variables
⋃n
i=1 xi and
⋃m
j=1 yj , respectively, the set Sk(φ, ψ) =
{θ :
⋃m
i=1 yi → TΣ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) | φ |=
I ψθ} is finite. Moreover, S has the finite
variable instantiation (fvi) property iff for all i ∈ [m] there exists j ∈ [n] such
that yiθ = xj, for each θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψ).
Example 8. Consider the constraints φ ≡ x ≈ f(x1, x2) and ψ ≡ x ≈ f(y1, y2).
Then φ |=H ∃y1∃y2 . ψ ⇔ φ |=H ψθ, where θ(x1) = y1 and θ(x2) = y2, i.e.
Sk(φ, ψ) = {θ}. ⊓⊔
Observe that, whenever S has the fvi property, a constraint with no subgoal
variables may not entail a constraint with more than one subgoal variables. If
S has the fvi property, φ(x) |=I ∃y1 . . .∃ym . ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) and m > 0 imply
Sk(φ, ψ) 6= ∅. But then each flat substitution θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψ) would have an empty
range, which is not possible.
Below we give an upper bound for the complexity of the problem whether
a given inductive system has the fvi property, in the canonical Herbrand inter-
pretation of constraints. It is unclear, for now, whether the bound below can
be tightened, because the exact complexity of the satisfiability of equational
problems is still unknown, in general6.
Lemma 4. The problem “Given a first order inductive system S, does S have
the fvi property?” is in NEXPTIME in the Herbrand interpretation. If there ex-
ists a constant K > 0, independent of the input, such that for each constraint
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), with goal variables x and subgoal variables
⋃n
i=1 xi, respectively,
we have ||xi|| ≤ K, then the problem is in NP.
The last condition required for completeness is also related to the elimination
of constraints from sequents. Intuitively, we do not allow two constraints to
overlap, having at least one model in common, without one entailing the other.
5 We assume w.l.o.g. that these function symbols belong to the signature, i.e. fy ∈ Σ
f .
6 Converting a formula into CNF requires exponential time at most, thus NEXPTIME is
an upper bound.
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Definition 6. An inductive system S is non-overlapping iff, for any two con-
straints φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) and ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) in S, with goal variables x and
subgoal variables
⋃n
i=1 xi and
⋃m
j=1 yj respectively, φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable only if
φ |=I ∃y1 . . .∃ym . ψ for a given I.
Example 9. The system from Example 1 is non-overlapping, because, for in-
stance, x ≈ f(x1, x2) ∧ x ≈ f(y1, y2) is satisfiable and x ≈ f(x1, x2) |=H
∃y1∃y2 . x ≈ f(y1, y2), whereas x ≈ f(x1, x2) ∧ x ≈ g(y1) is unsatisfiable. ⊓⊔
For a non-overlapping system, if φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn)∧ψ(x,y1 , . . . ,ym) is a satisfiable
conjunction of constraints, then the formulae ∃x1 . . . ∃xn . φ and ∃y1 . . .ym . ψ
are equivalent.
Lemma 5. The problem “Given a first order inductive system S, is S non-
overlapping?” is in NP in the Herbrand interpretation.
3.5 Soundness and Completeness
In this section we address the problems of soundness and completeness of the set
RId of inference rules (Definition 3.5) and show that RId is sound for entailments
in a given ranked system S, whereas completeness is guaranteed if, moreover, S
is non-filtering, non-overlapping and has the fvi property. We point out that the
soundness and completeness are independent of any particular interpretation of
First Order Logic and depend only on the restrictions from §3.4.
Soundness Here we develop the argument for soundness for the RId set of in-
ference rules. First, we prove that each rule from RId \ {ID} is locally sound
meaning that, if the consequent Γ ⊢ ∆ denotes an invalid entailment, i.e.
µSI(
∧
Γ ) 6⊆ µSI(
∨
∆) then at least one of its antecedents Γi ⊢ ∆i denotes
an invalid entailment. Moreover, we can relate the counterexample of the conse-
quent to the corresponding counterexample of the antecedent by a wfqo.
Lemma 6. Given an inductive system S that is ranked in the interpretation I,
for each instance of a schema R ∈ RId \ {ID}, with consequent Γ ⊢ ∆ and an-
tecedents {Γi ⊢ ∆i}
n
i=1 and each valuation ν ∈ µS
I(
∧
Γ )\µSI(
∨
∆), there exists
a valuation νi ∈ µS
I(
∧
Γi) \ µS
I(
∨
∆i) such that [[FV(Γi)]]νi 
∀∃
I [[FV(Γ )]]ν ,
for some i ∈ [n].
Local soundness allows to define a reachability relation between countermod-
els and we write ν ⋗ ν′ if ν is a counterexample of the consequent and ν′ is the
counterexample of the antecedent, as in the statement of Lemma 6.
Definition 7. A path v1, v2, . . . , vk in a proof D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) built with RId
is a counterexample path if there exists a sequence of valuations ν1, ν2, . . . , νk
such that, for all i ∈ [k] we have: (i) νi ∈ µSI(
∧
Γi)\µSI(
∨
∆i), where S(vi) =
Γi ⊢ ∆i, and (ii) if i < k then νi ⋗ νi+1.
Next, we prove that any direct counterexample path in a proof causes a strict
descent of multisets in the multiset ordering, provided that the system is ranked.
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Lemma 7. Given a system S and an interpretation I such that S is ranked in
I, let D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) be a proof and let π = v1, . . . , vk be a direct coun-
terexample path in D, with valuations ν1, . . . , νk, for a backlink (vk, v1). Then
[[FV(Γ1)]]ν1 ≻
∀∃
I [[FV(Γk)]]νk , where S(vi) = Γi ⊢ ∆i, for all i ∈ [k].
Next, we extend the reachability relation ⋗ to backlinks and show that, in
any infinite trace in a proof there exists an infinite strictly descending sequence
of multisets associated to countermodels, which clearly contradicts the well-
foundedness of the interpretation domain on which the ranking assumption is
based (Definition 4). This allows us to conclude that, in each proof using the
rules RId, there cannot be a counterexample for the sequent labeling the root.
Theorem 3. Given a ranked inductive system S, if a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ has a proof
D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) built with RId, and S(v0) = Γ ⊢ ∆, then the entailment∧
Γ |=IS
∨
∆ holds.
Completeness We prove that the set of inference rules RId is complete for en-
tailments between predicates in inductive systems that are ranked, non-filtering,
non-overlapping and have the fvi property (§3.4). A derivation is said to be
maximal if it cannot be extended by an application of an inference rule, and ir-
reducible if it cannot be rewritten into a smaller derivation of the same sequent
by an (ID) application. Note that the proof search semi-algorithm (1) generates
only irreducible derivations, because (ID) is always applied before any other
inference rules.
A derivation D is structured if, on each path of D, between any two con-
secutive applications of (LU) there exists an application of (RD). Intuitively,
unstructured derivations constitute poor candidates for proofs. For instance, a
derivation consisting only of applications of (LU) rules will only grow the size
of the left-hand sides of the sequents, without making progress towards ⊤ or
a counterexample. Observe that each subtree of a structured derivation is also
structured. We denote by D(Γ ⊢ ∆) the set of irreducible, maximal and struc-
tured derivations rooted in Γ ⊢ ∆.
Lemma 8. If the inductive system S has the fvi property, then the following
properties of derivations built with RslId hold:
1. any irreducible and structured derivation is finite, and
2. for any sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, the set D(Γ ⊢ ∆) is finite.
Definition 8. A set F = {φ1, . . . , φn, q1(x1), . . . , qm(xm)} is tree-shaped if and
only if φ1, . . . , φn are constraints, q1(x1), . . . qm(xm) are predicate atoms, and
there exist trees t1, . . . , tk such that:
– each node labeled with a constraint φi(y,y1, . . . ,yn) in some tree tℓ, ℓ ∈ [k]
has exactly n children and for all j ∈ [n], the j-th child is labeled either
(i) with a constraint whose goal variables are yj, or (ii) with a predicate
atom qk(yj), and
– a predicate atom qi(xi) may occur only on the frontier of a tree tj, for some
j ∈ [k].
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If k = 1 we say that F is singly-tree shaped.
Tree-shaped sets can be uniquely represented by trees labeled with formulae,
thus we use sets of trees instead of sets of formulae interchangeably. We write
Γ ⊢ ∆ ❀ Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ iff Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ occurs in a derivation from D(Γ ⊢ ∆). Next, we
prove an invariant on the shape of the sequents occurring in a proof of a basic
sequent p(x) ⊢ q(x).
Lemma 9. Given a system S and predicates p, q1, . . . , qn, in every sequent Γ ⊢
∆ such that p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀ Γ ⊢ ∆, Γ is a tree-shaped set and
∆ consists of finite conjunctions of tree-shaped sets, with all subgoal variables
existentially quantified.
The following lemma characterizes the cases in which the root of a derivation
is an invalid entailment, from which a counterexample can be extracted. This is
crucial in establishing our completeness result (Theorem 4). We write Γ ⊢ ∆❀
Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ iff Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ occurs in a derivation from D(Γ ⊢ ∆).
Lemma 10. Given an interpretation I, a non-filtering and non-overlapping in-
ductive system S with the fvi property, the predicate atoms p(x), q1(x), . . . , qn(x),
and a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ such that p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀ Γ ⊢ ∆, if every
derivation D ∈ D(Γ ⊢ ∆) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅ then there exists a valuation
ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI(
∨
∆).
The following theorem proves that RId is complete in the canonical interpre-
tation, and provides a proof search strategy.
Theorem 4. Given an interpretation I and a non-filtering, non-overlapping
inductive system S that is ranked in the interpretation I and has the fvi property,
let p, q1, . . . , qn be predicates occurring in S. Then the entailment p |=IS q1, . . . , qn
holds only if the sequent p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) has an S-proof with the set of
inference rules RId, where S is defined by the regular expression (LU ·RU
∗ ·RD ·
∧R∗ · SP?)∗ · LU? ·RU∗ · (AX | ID).
The proof search semi-algorithm (1) from §3.2 only explores irreducible deriva-
tions. If executed with the strategy S from Theorem 4, these derivations are also
structured. By Lemma 8 (1), irreducible and structured derivations are finite,
thus every execution of the semi-algorithm is guaranteed to terminate. If, more-
over, the input inductive system S is ranked, non-filtering, non-overlapping and
has the fvi property, then RId is complete and semi-algorithm (1) becomes a
decision procedure for this class of entailment problems.
4 Inductive Predicate Entailments in Separation Logic
In this section we apply the method described in §3 to deciding entailments
between predicates whose defining rules use constraints from a fragment of Sep-
aration Logic [Rey02]. These predicates are common for specifications of recur-
sive data structures implemented using pointers, thus having complete sets of
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proof rules for these systems is important for obtaining decision procedures that
solve verification conditions generated by program analysis tools. Using a sim-
ilar approach as for first order logic, we give a set of inference rules and prove
completeness under a number of (decidable) restrictions on the set of constraints
that occur in the system.
Throughout this section, we consider a signatureΣ, such thatΣs = {Loc,Bool}
and Σf = ∅, i.e. the only sorts are the boolean and location sort, with no function
symbols defined on it, other than equality. Observe that, in this case TΣ(x) = x,
for any x ⊆ Var, i.e. the only terms occurring in a formula are variables of
sort Loc. In the rest of this section we consider systems whose constraints are
Separation Logic (SL) formulae, generated by the following syntax:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | x ≈ y | emp | x 7→ (y1, . . . , yk) | ϕ1 ∗ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ1 | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ∃x . ϕ1
where k > 0 is a fixed constant. As usual, we consider that the constraints of
an inductive system are quantifier-free SL formulae in the above fragment. For
a set of formulae F = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}, we write ∗F for ϕ1 ∗ . . . ∗ϕn if F 6= ∅, and
emp if F = ∅. The size of a formula is the number of variables and connectives
occurring in it. The size of a system is the sum of the sizes of its constraints.
Most definitions of common recursive data structures employed by programers
(e.g. lists, trees, etc.) use a restricted fragment of quantifier-free SL, consisting
of formulae Π ∧Θ, called symbolic heaps, in the following syntax, for pure (Π)
and spatial (Θ) formulae defined as follows:
Π ::= x ≈ y | ¬x ≈ y | Π1 ∧Π2 Θ ::= emp | x 7→ (y1, . . . , yk) | Θ1 ∗Θ2
In the rest of this section, we fix an interpretation I such that I(Loc) = L
is a countably infinite set and omit to specify I any further. A heap is a finite
partial mapping h : L ⇀fin L
k associating locations with k-tuples of locations.
We denote by dom(h) the set of locations on which h is defined, by img(h) the
set of locations occurring in the range of h, and by Heaps the set of heaps. Two
heaps h1 and h2 are disjoint if dom(h1) ∩ dom(h2) = ∅. In this case h1 ⊎ h2
denotes their union, which is undefined if h1 and h2 are not disjoint. Given a
valuation ν : Var→ L and a heap h, the semantics of SL formulae is defined as:
ν, h |=sl x ≈ y ⇐⇒ ν(x) = ν(y)
ν, h |=sl emp ⇐⇒ h = ∅
ν, h |=sl x 7→ (y1, . . . , yk) ⇐⇒ h = {〈ν(x), (ν(y1), . . . , ν(yk))〉}
ν, h |=sl φ1 ∗ φ2 ⇐⇒ ∃h1, h2 ∈ Heaps . h = h1 ⊎ h2 and ν, hi |=sl φi, i ∈ [2]
ν, h |=sl ∃x . ϕ(x) ⇐⇒ ν[x← ℓ], h |=sl ϕ(x), for some ℓ ∈ L
The semantics of boolean connectives is the usual one, omitted for brevity.
An assignment X maps each predicate p(x1, . . . , xn) to a set X (p) ⊆ Ln ×
Heaps. For a set F = {φ, p1(x1), . . . , pm(xm)}, where φ is a SL formula and
p1(x1), . . . , pm(xm) ∈ Pred, we define X (∗F ) = {(ν, h0 ⊎
⊎m
i=1 hi) | ν, h0 |=
sl
φ, (ν(xj), hj) ∈ X (pj), j ∈ [m]}. The least solution µS sl of a system S is the least
fixed point of the function FslS , where F
sl
S(X ) maps each predicate p(x) ∈ Pred,
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such that p(x)←S R1 | . . . | Rm, into the set
⋃m
i=1{(ν(x), h) | (ν, h) ∈ X (∗Ri)}.
Observe that the heaps from the subgoal assignments are separately joined with
a heap satisfying the constraint of the rule to obtain a heap for the goal. In this
section we consider entailments between predicates p |=sl q1, . . . , qn if and only if
µS sl(p) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 µS
sl(qi). As before, we extend this notation to SL formulae and
write φ |=sl ψ for µS sl(φ) ⊆ µS sl(ψ), where, for an arbitrary SL formula ϕ, µS sl(ϕ)
is defined recursively on its structure.
Example 10. Consider the following system, with symbolic heap constraints:
ls+(x, y)←S x 7→ y | y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z, ls+(z, y′)
lse(x, y) ←S x ≈ y ∧ emp | y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z, lso(z, y′)
lso(x, y) ←S x 7→ y | y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z, lse(z, y′)
l̂s
+
(x, y)←S y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z ∗ lse(z, y′) | y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z ∗ lso(z, y′)
Intuitively, ls+(x, y) defines the set of finite list segments of at least one element
between x and y, lse and lso are list segments of even and odd length, respec-
tively, and l̂s
+
(x, y) is the definition of a list segment consisting of one element
followed by an even or an odd list segment. It is immediate to see that both
entailments ls+ |=sl l̂s
+
and l̂s
+
|=sl ls+ hold. ⊓⊔
The following negative result [IRV14,AGH+14] justifies a number of restric-
tions on the set of SL constraints occurring in a system7 (§4.2).
Theorem 5. The entailment problem is undecidable for systems with symbolic
heap constraints.
4.1 Inference Rules
(AXsl)
⊤
Γ ⊢ ∆
∗Γ |=sl∨∆ (RUsl)
Γ ⊢ {∃yi . ∗Ri(x,yi)}ni=1 , ∆ \ p(x)
Γ ⊢ ∆
p(x)∈∆, y1,...,yn fresh
p(x)←SR1(x,y1)|...|Rn(x,yn)
(RDsl)
p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}
i
j=1
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {∃yj . ψj(x,yj) ∗ Qj(yj)}
k
j=1
φ|=sl
∧i
j=1 ∃yj .ψj
φ 6|=sl
∨k
j=i+1 ∃yj .ψj
Sj⊆Sk(φ,ψj),j∈[i]
(SPsl)
〈pı¯j (x) ⊢ {q
ℓ
ı¯j
(x) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j}〉
nk
j=1
p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ Q1(x1, . . . ,xn), . . . ,Qk(x1, . . . ,xn)
∀i,j∈[n] .xi∩xj=∅, ı¯∈[n]
nk
Qi=∗nj=1 qij(xj),Qi=〈qi1,...,qin〉
F(Q1,...,Qk)={f1,...,fnk}
Fig. 2. The set RslId of inference rule schemata for SL inductive entailments.
We modify the RId proof system (§3.3) by systematically replacing boolean
with spatial conjunctions, in order to match the semantics of the rules in a
7 See e.g. [IRV14, Theorem 2] and [AGH+14, Theorem 3].
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system, which separately join the constraint and subgoal heaps into a goal heap.
We obtain the proof system RslId = {LU,RUsl,RDsl,∧R, SPsl,AXsl, ID}, where the
inference rule schemata RUsl, RDsl, SPsl and AXsl are depicted in Figure 2.
Example 11. Below we give a proof for the sequent ls+(x, y) |=u l̂s
+
(x, y), using
the rules in Figure 2:
ls+(x, y) ⊢ l̂s
+
(x, y)
y ≈ z2 ∧ x 7→ z1, ls
+(z1, z2) ⊢ l̂s
+
(x, y)
y ≈ z2 ∧ x 7→ z1, ls
+(z1, z2)⊢∃u1∃u2 . y ≈ u2 ∧ x 7→ u1 ∗ ls
e(u1, u2),
∃u1∃u2 . y ≈ u2 ∧ x 7→ u1 ∗ ls
o(u1, u2)
ls+(z1, y) ⊢ ls
e(z1, y), ls
o(z1, y)
y ≈ u2 ∧ z1 7→ u1, ls
+(u1, u2) ⊢ ls
e(z1, y), ls
o(z1, y)
y ≈ u2 ∧ z1 7→ u1, ls
+(u1, u2) ⊢ z1 ≈ y ∧ emp,∃v1∃v2 . y ≈ v2 ∧ z1 7→ v1 ∗ ls
o(v1, v2), ls
o(z1, y)
y ≈ u2 ∧ z1 7→ u1, ls
+(u1, u2)⊢ z1 ≈ y ∧ emp,∃v1∃v2 . y ≈ v2 ∧ z1 7→ v1 ∗ ls
o(v1, v2),
z1 7→ y,∃v1∃v2 . y ≈ v2 ∧ z1 7→ v1 ∗ ls
e(v1, v2)
ls+(u1, y) ⊢ ls
o(u1, y), ls
e(u1, y)
⊤
LU
RUsl
RDsl
LU
RUsl
RUsl
RDsl
ID
For space reasons, several simple branches of the proof are omitted. ⊓⊔
4.2 Restricting the Set of Constraints
In this section we state the counterparts of the semantic restrictions introduced
in §3.4, necessary for soundness and completeness. Moreover, we give complexity
bounds for the problem of deciding whether a certain system, with quantifier-free
SL and symbolic heap constraints, respectively, complies with these restrictions.
Definition 9. An SL inductive system S is non-filtering iff, for every 〈{φ, q1(x1),
. . . , qn(xn)}, p(x)〉 ∈ S, for all i ∈ [n] and (ℓi, hi) ∈ µS sl(qi), where hi are pair-
wise disjoint heaps, there exists a valuation ν and a heap h, disjoint from
⊎n
i=1 hi,
such that ν, h |=sl φ and ν(xi) = ℓi, for all i ∈ [n].
Example 12. The system from Example 10 is non-filtering because there exists
a model ν, h |=sl y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z, such that ν(y′) = ν′(y′), ν(z) = ν′(z) and
dom(h) ∩ dom(h′) = ∅, for each given pair (ν′, h′). Since the set L is infinite, it
is always possible to find a value ν(x) 6∈ dom(h′). ⊓⊔
As opposed to the case of systems with first-order constraints, under the
Herbrand interpretation (Lemma 2), the non-filtering property is decidable for
systems with SL constraints. This is because one can build an over-approximation
of the least solution, that is both necessary and sufficient to characterize the
satisfiability of a quantifier-free SL formula using predicate atoms [BFPG14].
The lemma below establishes the upper bound for the complexity of deciding
whether a given inductive system is non-filtering.
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Lemma 11. The problem “Given an inductive system S with −∗-free SL con-
straints, is S non-filtering?” is in EXPSPACE.
Next, we turn to the ranking condition, that ensures the soundness of ap-
plying the principle of Infinite Descent to a system with SL constraints. In the
absence of a natural wfqo on the set of locations L (since there are no relations
other than equality defined on it), we consider the following wfqo on heaps.
For any h1, h2 ∈ Heaps, we have h1 ✂ h2 iff there exists h ∈ Heaps such that
h2 = h1 ⊎ h. We write h1 ✁ h2 if, moreover, h 6= ∅.
Definition 10. An SL inductive system S is ranked iff for every predicate rule
〈{φ, q1(x1), . . . , qn(xn)}, p(x)〉 ∈ S and every (ℓi, hi) ∈ µS(qi), i ∈ [n] there
exists (ℓ, h) ∈ µS(p) such that
⊎n
i=1 hi ✁ h.
Example 13. The system of Example 10 is ranked because each rule with at least
one subgoal has a constraint y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z, which does not admit an empty
heap model. ⊓⊔
Lemma 12. The problem “Given an SL inductive system S, is S ranked in
the subheap order (Heaps,✂)?” is in PSPACE . When considering symbolic heap
constraints, the problem is in P.
We continue with the finite variable instantiation (fvi) property (cf. Definition
5) for quantifier-free SL constraints. We show that this problem is decidable and
provide several upper bounds.
Example 14. The system from Example 10 has the fvi property, because the
entailment y ≈ y1 ∧ x 7→ z1 |=sl ∃y2∃z2 . y ≈ y2 ∧ x 7→ z2 is witnessed by a single
substitution θ(y2) = y1 and θ(z2) = z1. ⊓⊔
Lemma 13. The problem “Given an SL inductive system S, does S have the
fvi property?” is in PSPACE if S has quantifier-free and −∗-free SL constraints,
and in ΣP2 if S has symbolic heap constraints.
A related question is whether an inductive system with quantfier-free SL
constraints is non-overlapping (cf. Definition 6).
Example 15. The system from Example 10 is non-overlapping because the only
constraints with a satisfiable conjunction are x 7→ y and y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z and
both entailments x 7→ y |=sl ∃y′∃z . y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z and y ≈ y′ ∧ x 7→ z |=sl x 7→ y
are valid. ⊓⊔
Lemma 14. The problem “Given an SL inductive system S, is S non-overlapping?”
is in PSPACE if S has quantifier-free and −∗-free SL constraints, and in ΣP2 if
S has symbolic heap constraints.
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4.3 Soundness and Completeness
Soundness We develop the argument for the soundness of the RslId set of in-
ference rules in similar fashion as we did for RId. The following lemma is the
counter-part of Lemma 6 and gives the local soundness of RslId \ {ID}.
Lemma 15. Given a ranked SL inductive system S, for each instance of an
inference rule schema in RslId\{ID}, having the consequent Γ ⊢ ∆ and antecedents
Γi ⊢ ∆i with i ∈ [n], and each (ν, h) ∈ µS sl(
∧
Γ ) \ µS sl(
∨
∆), there exists
(νi, hi) ∈ µS sl(
∧
Γi) \ µS sl(
∨
∆i) for some i ∈ [n] such that hi ✂ h.
We consider a reachability relation between counterexamples and write (ν, h)⋗
(ν′, h′) when, given any instance of an inference rule in RslId \ ID, (ν, h) is a
counterexample of the consequent and (ν′, h′) is a counterexample of one of its
antecedents obtained from (ν, h), as shown in the proof of Lemma 15. With this
in mind, we revisit the definition of a counterexample path and adapt it to SL.
Definition 11. A path v1, v2, . . . , vk in a proof D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) built with
RslId is a counterexample path if there exists a sequence of pairs (ν1, h1), (ν2, h2),
. . . , (νk, hk) such that, for all i ∈ [k] we have: (i) (νi, hi) ∈ µS
sl(
∧
Γi)\µS
sl(
∨
∆i),
where S(vi) = Γi ⊢ ∆i, and (ii) if i < k then (νi, hi)⋗ (νi+1, hi+1).
The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 7 and shows that any
direct counterexample path in a proof causes a strict heap descent provided that
the system is ranked.
Lemma 16. Given a ranked SL system S, let D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) be a proof
built with RslId and let π = v1, . . . , vk be a direct counterexample path in D, with
pairs (ν1, h1), . . . , (νk, hk), for a backlink (vk, v1). Then h1 ✄ hk, where S(vi) =
Γi ⊢ ∆i, for all i ∈ [k].
Finally, the following theorem extends the reachability relation ⋗ to back-
links and shows that any infinite trace in a proof leads to an infinite strictly
decreasing sequence of heaps, contradicting the well-foundedness of the wfqo
which makes the inductive system be ranked (Definition 10). Then there cannot
exist a counterexample for any sequent labelling the root of a proof built with
RslId and the associated entailment must hold.
Theorem 6. Given a ranked SL inductive system S, if a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ has a
proof D = (V, v0, S, R, P ) built with R
sl
Id, and S(v0) = Γ ⊢ ∆, then the entailment
∗Γ |=slS
∨
∆ holds.
Completeness The RslId proof system is not complete for SL entailments, even
for those systems which comply with the conditions in §4.2. This section proves
the completeness of the setRslId for a more restricted class of entailment problems.
The existence of a complete set of inference rules for the general entailment
problem of SL is, to our knowledge, still open.
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We consider assignments X mapping a predicate p of arity n into a sub-
set of Ln × Heaps × Cover. For a singly-tree shaped set (Definition 8) repre-
sented as a tree T , we define X (∗T ) to be the set of tuples (ν, h, t), where
ν :
⋃
p∈dom(T ) FV(T (p))→ L is a valuation, h is a heap and t is a coverage tree
for h, where:
– for each p ∈ dom(T ) \ fr(T ), we have ν, t(p) |=sl T (p),
– for each p ∈ fr(T ) where T (p) = q(x), there exists (ν(x), t(p), t|p) ∈ X (q).
The above definition is extended to the tree-shaped sets T1, . . . , Tk such that
X (∗ {T1, . . . , Tk}) = {(ν, h1 ⊎ . . . ⊎ hk, {t1, . . . , tk}) | (ν, hi, ti) ∈ X (∗Ti), i ∈
[k]}. With this interpretation of predicates and formulae, the least solution µSu
of a system S is the least fixed point of the function FuS(X ), mapping each
predicate p ∈ Pred into
⋃m
i=1 {(ν(x), h, t) | (ν, h, t) ∈ X (∗Ri)}, where p(x) ←S
R1 | . . . | Rm.
For each (ν, h, t) ∈ µSu(p), for some p ∈ Pred, we say that t is an unfolding
tree for the singly-tree shaped set T . Then the entailment problem becomes
p |=uS q1, . . . , qn iff µS
u(p) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 µS
u(q1), given predicates p, q1, . . . , qn ∈ Pred.
It is not difficult to prove that p |=uS q1, . . . , qn implies p(x) |=
sl
S q1, . . . , qn, but
not vice versa.
Akin to the derivations built with RId, we denote by Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∆) the set
of irreducible, maximal and structured8 derivations of Γ ⊢ ∆ built with RslId.
Also, we write Γ ⊢ ∆ ❀sl Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ if Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ occurs inside a derivation from
D
sl(Γ ⊢ ∆).
The following lemmas are the SL counterparts of the ones in Section 3.5.
Since RslId is structurally the same as RId, we need not redo the proofs, as they
closely resemble the ones for Lemma 8 and Lemma 9.
Lemma 17. If the SL inductive system S has the fvi property, then the following
properties of derivations built with RslId hold:
1. any irreducible and structured derivation is finite, and
2. for any sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, the set Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∆) is finite.
Lemma 18. Given an SL inductive system S and predicates p, q1, . . . , qn, in
every sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ such that p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀
sl Γ ⊢ ∆, Γ is a tree-
shaped set and ∆ consists of finite separating conjunctions of tree-shaped sets,
with all subgoal variables existentially quantified.
The following lemma proves an invariant that relates tree-shaped sets with
their corresponding unfolding trees, and is the counterpart of Lemma 10, needed
to prove the completeness of RslId, for systems with symbolic heap constraints,
with the above definition of entailments.
Lemma 19. Given a non-filtering and non-overlapping SL system S with quantifier-
free SL constraints, having the fvi property, the predicate atoms p(x), q1(x), . . . , qn(x),
and a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ such that p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀sl Γ ⊢ ∆, if every
8 A derivation is structured if and only if there is an occurrence of (RDsl) between any
two consecutive applications of (LU).
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derivation D ∈ Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∆) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅ then there exists a valuation ν,
a heap h and a set of unfolding trees U such that (ν, h, U) ∈ µSu(∗Γ )\µSu(
∨
∆).
The completeness proof for RslId mirrors closely the proof of Theorem 4 (§3.5).
Theorem 7. Given a ranked, non-filtering, non-overlapping SL inductive sys-
tem S with the fvi property, let p, q1, . . . , qn be predicates occurring in S. Then
the entailment p |=uS q1, . . . , qn holds only if the sequent p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x)
has an S-proof with the set of inference rules RslId, where S is defined by the
regular expression (LU · RU∗
sl
· RDsl · ∧R∗ · SPsl?)∗ · LU? · RU
∗
sl
· (AXsl | ID).
Because each S-derivation is structured, the proof search semi-algorithm 1
terminates on all inputs, when given S as strategy. A direct consequence of The-
orem 7 is that algorithm 1 is a decision procedure for entailments p |=u q1, . . . , qn,
when p, q1, . . . , qn are defined by an inductive system S with quantifier-free SL
constraints, that is ranked, non-filtering, non-overlapping and has the fvi prop-
erty. As discussed in §4.2, the problem whether a given system enjoys these
properties is decidable.
5 Conclusions
We present a cyclic proof system for entailments between inductively defined
predicates written using (multisorted) First Order Logic, based on Fermat’s prin-
ciple of Infinite Descent. The advantage of this principle over classical induction
is that the inductive invariants are produced during proof search, whereas in-
duction requires them to be provided. The soundness of this principle is coined
by a semantic restriction on the constraints of the inductive system, that asks
that models generated by unfoldings decrease in a well-founded domain. On
the other hand, completeness relies on an argument inspired by the theory of
tree automata, that is applicable under three semantic restrictions on the set of
constraints. In general all these restrictions are decidable, with computational
complexities that depend on the logical fragment in which the constraints of the
inductive system are written.
Moreover, we extend the proof system for First Order Logic to Separation
Logic and analyze its proof-theoretic properties. While soundness is maintained
by a similar ranking property as in First Order Logic, completeness is lost, in
general. We recover completeness partially by restricting the semantics of entail-
ments with a notion of (matching) unfolding trees. Extending the proof system
to handle limited cases of entailments between divergent predicates, whose un-
folding trees do not match, but are related by reversal and rotation relations is
possible. The completeness and algorithmic properties of such extensions, such
as the decidability of the entailment problem, are considered for future work.
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A Additional Material
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let D∗ be the set of finite sequences of elements from D, where ui denotes
the i-th element of u ∈ D∗ and |u| is the length of u. The subword order ≤sw on
D∗ is defined as u ≤sw v iff there exists a strictly increasing mapping f : [|u|]→
[|v|] such that ui = vf(i) for all i ∈ [|u|]. A qo  on D induces the following
order on the set D∗: for all u, v ∈ D∗, u ∗ v if there exists v′ ≤sw v such that
|u| = |v′| and ui  v′i, for all i = 1, . . . , |u|. Because D is countable, there is an
indexing of its elements. Then each finite set S ∈ Pfin(D) is uniquely represented
as a finite word and the result follows from Higman’s Lemma [Hig52], which
states that (D,) is a wqo only if (D∗,∗) is a wqo. ⊓⊔
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof is by reduction from the inclusion problem for context-free lan-
guages, a known undecidable problem [Sip97, Theorem 5.10]. Let G = 〈Ξ,Σ,∆〉
be a context-free grammar, where Ξ is the set of nonterminals, Σ is the alphabet
of terminals, and ∆ is a set of productions (X,w) ∈ Ξ × (Ξ ∪Σ)∗. For a nonter-
minal X ∈ Ξ, we denote by LX(G) ⊆ Σ
∗ the language produced by G starting
with X as axiom. The problem ”given X,Y ∈ Ξ, does LX(G) ⊆ LY (G)?” is
undecidable. Given a context-free grammar G = 〈Ξ,Σ,∆〉, we define a system
SG as follows:
– each nonterminal X ∈ Ξ corresponds to a predicate X(xσ, yσ), where σ is
the only sort used in the reduction,
– each alphabet symbol a ∈ Σ corresponds to a function symbol aσ,σ, and a
word w = a1 . . . an ∈ Σ∗ is encoded by the context (i.e. the term with a
hole) w = a1(. . . an(.)),
– each grammar rule (X,u1X1 . . . unXnun+1) ∈ ∆ corresponds to a rule:
〈{φ(x, y, x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn), X1(x1, y1), . . . , Xn(xn, yn)} , X(x, y)〉
of SG, where φ ≡ x ≈ u1(x1) ∧
∧n−1
i=1 yi ≈ ui+1(xi+1) ∧ yn ≈ un+1(y) . In
particular, a rule (ǫ,X) ∈ ∆ maps into a rule 〈{x ≈ y} , X(x, y)〉 of SG.
We must check that, for any nonterminals X,Y ∈ Ξ, we have LX(G) ⊆ LY (G)
if and only if X |=HSG Y . This is proved using the following invariant:
∀w ∈ Σ∗ . (∀t ∈ σH . [x← w(t), y ← t] ∈ µSHG(X))⇔ w ∈ LX(G)
where [x← t, y ← u] denotes the valuation mapping x to t and y to u. ⊓⊔
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let τ be an infinite trace in D = (V, v0, S, R, P ). Since V is finite, τ must
contain infinitely many backlinks. Moreover, V × V is also finite and there can
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only be a finite number of backlink, thus there must exist a backlink (vi−1, vi)
that repeats infinitely often in τ .
Next, we prove that for every finite trace ρ = vi, . . . , vi−1, where (vi−1, vi)
is a backlink, there exists a direct path in ρ, by induction on the number
N of backlinks in ρ. If N = 0 the direct path is trivially ρ. For the induc-
tion step N > 0, we suppose that the property holds for any N ′ < N . Let
ρ = vi, . . . , vj−1, vj , . . . , vi−1, where (vj−1, vj) is the last backlink on ρ. Then
the suffix vj . . . vi−1 of ρ is a path. Since (vi−1, vi) is a backlink, then vi is a
predecessor of vi−1 in D, thus vi, vj and vi−1 are on the same branch on D. We
distinguish two cases:
– If vj is vi or a predecessor of vi then there exists a direct path from vi to
vi−1 in ρ and we are done, because ρ = vi, . . . , vj−1, vj , . . . , vi, . . . , vi−1 and
there are no more backlinks between vj and vi−1.
– Else, if vi is a strict predecessor of vj , we show that there must exist another
occurrence of vj in the prefix vi, . . . , vj−1 of ρ. Note that vi, vj and vj−1
occur on the same branch in D. Suppose, by contradiction, that vk 6= vj , for
all k ∈ [i, j − 1]. To reach vj−1 from vi there must exist a strict predecessor
u ∈ V of vj and a subsequence of ρ from u to some strict successor u′ ∈ V of
vj that goes through one or more backlinks (see the figure below). However
this is not possible, since each backlink leads from a leaf of D to one of
its predecessors, thus any trace starting at vi, passing through u and then
following a different branch than the one on which vi, vj and vj−1 reside, can
only return to this branch at u or predecessors of u, whereas u′ is a strict
successor of u.
. . .
vi
vj
vj−1
u
u′
We have shown that there exists k ∈ [i, j − 1] such that vk = vj , thus we
have a subsequence ρ′ = vk, . . . , vj−1 of ρ, where (vj−1, vk) is a backlink,
containing N ′ < N backlinks. By the induction hypothesis, ρ′ contains a
direct path, which concludes the induction proof.
Therefore, each finite subtrace vi−1, . . . , vi contains a direct path. Because the
backlink (vi−1, vi) occurs infinitely often in τ , there are infinitely many such
subtraces in τ , we can conclude that τ contains infinitely many direct paths. ⊓⊔
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By reduction from the following undecidable problem: given a context-
free grammar G = 〈Ξ,Σ,∆〉, where Ξ is the set of nonterminals, Σ is the al-
phabet of terminals, and ∆ is a set of productions (X,w) ∈ Ξ × (Ξ ∪ Σ)∗,
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and two nonterminals X,Y ∈ Ξ, is it the case that LX(G) ∩ LY (G) 6= ∅,
where LX(G) ⊆ Σ∗ denotes the language produced by G starting with X as
axiom. We encode G as a system, in the same way as done in the proof of
Theorem 2, each nonterminal Z ∈ Ξ corresponding to a predicate Z(x, y).
Then we encode the problem LX(G) ∩ LY (G) 6= ∅ using an additional rule
〈{x1 ≈ x2 ∧ y1 ≈ y2, X(x1, y1), Y (x2, y2)} , P ()〉. It is easy to check that the sys-
tem is non-filtering iff LX(G) ∩ LY (G) 6= ∅. ⊓⊔
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. If [[x]]ν ≻
∀∃
I [[y]]µ, since trivially [[y]]µ = ([[x]]ν \ [[x]]ν) ∪ [[y]]µ, we have
[[x]]ν ≻
† [[y]]µ, where ≻
† is the Manna-Dershowitz multiset wfqo [DM79]. Then
an infinite strictly decreasing sequence in ≻∀∃I would imply the existence of an
infinite strictly decreasing sequence in ≻†, contradicting [DM79, Theorem 1]. ⊓⊔
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Since the satisfiability of the quantifier-free fragment of the first order
logic with a binary relation symbol interpreted as the subterm relation is an NP-
complete problem [Ven87], one can effectively decide if a given system is ranked.
For each constraint φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) we check if the formula
φ ∧
∨
y∈x1∪...∪xn
∧
x∈x
(y ≈ x ∨ ¬y ⊑ x)
is unsatisfiable, where ⊑ is interpreted as the subtree order. Since the size of the
latter formula is polynomially bounded in the size of φ, the problem of checking
if a given system is ranked is in co-NP. ⊓⊔
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let S be a system and φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) be two arbitrary
constraints, with goal variables x and subgoal variables
⋃n
i=1 xi and
⋃m
j=1 yj ,
respectively. Then S has the fvi property if and only if the following entailment
does not hold:
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) |=
H ∃y1 . . . ∃ym . ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) ∧
m∨
j=1
n∧
i=1
¬(yj ∼= xi)
where yj ∼= xi is a shorthand for
(∧
y∈yj
∨
x∈xi
y ≈ x
)
∧
(∧
x∈xi
∨
y∈yj
y ≈ x
)
.
In other words, S has the fvi property if and only if the following equational
problem has a solution:
∃x∃x1 . . . ∃xn∀y1 . . . ∀ym . φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn)∧
m∧
j=1
¬ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym)∨
n∨
i=1
yj ∼= xi
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The last formula is not in CNF and expanding the formulae yj ∼= xi to obtain a
CNF form causes a simply exponential blowup. Since checking the satisfiability of
an equational problem in CNF is NP-complete, the above check can be performed
in NEXPTIME. If the size of each set of subgoal variables is bound to a constant,
not part of the input, the size of each clause in the CNF expansion of the above
formula is constants, thus there are at most polynomially many such constants
and we apply [Pic03, Theorem 5.2] to obtain the NP upper bound. ⊓⊔
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Given a first order inductive system S, in order to determine if S has the
non-overlapping property, it suffices to check that, for any two constraints φ, ψ
of S, where y1, . . . ,ym are the subgoal variables of ψ: (i) φ∧ψ is satisfiable and
(ii) φ |=I ∃y1 . . .∃ym . ψ is valid. Checking the validity of the entailment in (ii)
can be reduced to checking that the formula ∀y1 . . . ∀ym . φ∧¬ψ is unsatisfiable.
Under the Herbrand interpretation, since φ and ψ are both conjunctions of
literals, φ ∧ ψ and φ ∧ ¬ψ are in conjunctive normal form. Then both problems
(i) and (ii) are in NP [Pic03], and, thus the non-overlapping problem under the
Herbrand interpretation is in NP . ⊓⊔
A.9 Soundness of the SP inference rule in RId
Lemma 20. Given a system S, with predicates p1, . . . , pn and tuples of predi-
cates Qi =
〈
qi1, . . . , q
i
n
〉
in S, for all i ∈ [k]. Then
µSI(p1)× . . .× µS
I(pn) ⊆
k⋃
i=1
µSI(qi1)× . . .× µS
I(qin)
if and only if there exists a tuple ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
, such that:
µSI(pı¯j ) ⊆
⋃
{µSI(qℓı¯j ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j}
for all j ∈ [nk], where F(Q1, . . . ,Qk) = {f1, . . . , fnk}.
Proof. By [HLSV11, Theorem 1], we have:
µSI(p1)× . . .× µSI(pn) ⊆
⋃k
i=1 µS
I(qi1)× . . .× µS
I(qin) ⇔∧nk
j=1
∨n
i=1
(
µSI(pi) ⊆
⋃
{µSI(qℓi ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = i}
)
⇔∨
ı¯∈[n]nk
∧nk
j=1
(
µSI(pı¯j ) ⊆
⋃
{µSI(qℓı¯j ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j}
)
The last step is the expansion of the formula in disjunctive normal form. ⊓⊔
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A.10 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. In the case of (AX), the lemma is trivially true because the list of an-
tecedents is empty. For (LU), (RU), (∧R), (RD) and (SP) we do the following
case split.
Case (LU). Let p(x) ∈ Γ be a predicate atom, where p(x) ←S R1(x,x1) | . . . |
Rn(x,xn) and xi ⊆ Var \ FV(Γ ∪∆) for each i ∈ [n]. The antecedents of Γ ⊢ ∆
are Γi ⊢ ∆i = Ri(x,xi), Γ \ p(x) ⊢ ∆, with i ∈ [n]. The least solution of Γ is
µSI(
∧
Γ ) = µSI(p(x)) ∩ µSI (
∧
(Γ \ p(x)))
=
(⋃n
i=1 µS
I (
∧
Ri(x))
)
∩ µSI (
∧
(Γ \ p(x)))
=
⋃n
i=1 µS
I (
∧
Ri(x) ∧
∧
(Γ \ p(x)))
If there exists ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ )\µSI(
∧
∆), then also ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Ri(x,yi)∧
∧
(Γ \
p(x))) ⊆ µSI(
∧
Γ ) for some i ∈ [n] and some yi ⊆ Var \ FV(Γ ∪ ∆). Then
there also exists νi such that for every x ∈ FV(Γ ) we have νi(x) = ν(x) and
also νi(xi) = ν(yi). Furthermore, because S is ranked, [[xi]]νi ≺
∀∃
I [[x]]ν . Since
FV(Γi) = FV(Γ )∪xi and x ⊆ FV(Γ ), it follows that [[FV(Γi)]]νi 
∀∃
I [[FV(Γ )]]ν .
Case (RU). Let p(x) ∈ ∆ be a predicate atom, where p(x)←S R1(x,x1) | . . . |
Rn(x,xn) and xi ⊆ Var \ FV(Γ ∪ ∆) for each i ∈ [n]. Then Γ ⊢ ∆ has only
one antecedent Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 = Γ ⊢ ∃x1.
∧
R1(x,x1), . . . , ∃xn.
∧
Rn(x,xn), ∆ \ p(x).
Note that FV(Γ1) = FV(Γ ). In this case, the least solution of ∆ is
µSI(
∨
∆) = µSI (p(x) ∨
∨
(∆ \ p(x))) = µSI(p(x)) ∪ µSI (
∨
(∆ \ p(x)))
=
(⋃n
i=1 µS
I (
∧
Ri(x))
)
∪ µSI (
∨
(∆ \ p(x)))
=
(⋃n
i=1 µS
I (∃xi.
∧
Ri(x,xi))
)
∪ µSI (
∨
(∆ \ p(x)))
= µSI (
∨n
i=1 ∃xi.
∧
Ri(x,xi)) ∪ µSI (
∨
(∆ \ p(x)))
= µSI (
∨n
i=1 ∃xi.
∧
Ri(x,xi) ∨
∨
(∆ \ p(x))) = µSI(
∨
∆1)
If there exists a valuation ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ )\µSI (
∨
∆), then it is also the case that
ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ1) \ µSI (
∨
∆1). Therefore, the counterexample for the antecedent
is ν1 = ν and [[FV(Γ1)]]ν1 
∀∃
I [[FV(Γ )]]ν holds trivially.
Case (RD). Then the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ = φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢
{∃yj .ψj(x,yj)∧Qj(yj)}
k
j=1 has only one antecedent Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 = p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢
{Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}ij=1. By the side condition of (RD), φ |=
I
∧i
j=1 ∃yj .ψj . Also, by
Definition 5, for each θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj), we have µSI(φ) ⊆ µSI(ψjθ) for all j ∈ [i].
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In this case, the least solution of ∆ is
µSI (
∨
∆) = µSI
(∨k
j=1 ∃yj .ψj ∧ Qj
)
⊇
⋃k
j=1 µS
I (∃yj .ψj ∧ Qj) ⊇
⋃i
j=1 µS
I (∃yj .ψj ∧Qj)
=
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI ((ψj ∧ Qj)θ)
=
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI (ψjθ ∧ Qjθ)
⊇
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
(
µSI (ψjθ) ∩ µS
I(Qjθ)
)
=
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI (ψjθ) ∩
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI(Qjθ)
Note that also µSI(
∧
Γ ) = µSI (φ)∩µSI (p1(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ pn(xn)). If there exists
a valuation ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI (
∨
∆), then
ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ (
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI (ψjθ) ∩
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI(Qjθ))
= µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ (
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI (ψjθ)) ∪
µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ (
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI(Qjθ))
= ∅ ∪ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ (
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI(Qjθ))
⊆ µSI (p1(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ pn(xn)) \ (
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µSI(Qjθ))
⊆ µSI (p1(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ pn(xn)) \ (
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sj
µSI(Qjθ))
= µSI(
∧
Γ1) \ µS
I(
∨
∆1)
Therefore, the counterexample for the antecedent is ν1 = ν. Because φ is intro-
duced to the left-hand side by left unfolding and S is ranked, we have [[x1∪ . . .∪
xn]]ν ≺
∀∃
I [[x]]ν . Then [[FV(Γ1)]]ν1 ≺
∀∃
I [[FV(Γ )]]ν .
Case (∧R). Let ∆ = {p(x) ∧ q(x) ∧ Q} ∪∆′. Then the antecedents of Γ ⊢ ∆
are Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 = Γ ⊢ p(x) ∧ Q, ∆′ and Γ2 ⊢ ∆2 = Γ ⊢ q(x) ∧ Q, ∆′. In this case,
the least solution of ∆ is
µSI(
∨
∆) = µSI (p(x) ∧ q(x) ∧Q ∨
∨
∆′)
= µSI (p(x) ∧ Q ∧ q(x) ∧Q ∨
∨
∆′)
= µSI (p(x) ∧ Q) ∩ µSI (q(x) ∧ Q) ∪ µSI (
∨
∆′)
=
(
µSI(p(x) ∧Q) ∪ µSI (
∨
∆′)
)
∩
(
µSI(q(x) ∧ Q) ∪ µSI (
∨
∆′)
)
= µSI (p(x) ∧ Q ∨
∨
∆′) ∩ µSI (q(x) ∧ Q ∨
∨
∆′)
= µSI(
∨
∆1) ∩ µS
I(
∨
∆2)
If there exists a valuation ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI (
∨
∆), then also ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \
(µSI(
∨
∆1)∩µSI(
∨
∆2)) = (µSI(
∧
Γ )\µSI(
∨
∆1))∪(µSI(
∧
Γ )\µSI(
∨
∆2)).
Therefore, ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γi) \ µSI(
∨
∆i) for some i ∈ [2] and the counterexample
for Γi ⊢ ∆i is νi = ν. Because Γ = Γ1 = Γ2, we have [[FV(Γi)]]νi 
∀∃
I [[FV(Γ )]]ν .
Case (SP). Then Γ ⊢ ∆ = p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {
∧n
i=1 q
j
i (xi)}
k
j=1. For each
ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
, the antecedents of Γ ⊢ ∆ are Γ ı¯j ⊢ ∆
ı¯
j = pı¯j (xı¯j ) ⊢ {q
ℓ
ı¯j
(xı¯j ) | ℓ ∈
[k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j}, j ∈ [nk].
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If there exists a valuation ν ∈ µSI (
∧n
i=1 pi(xi)) \ µS
I
(∨k
j=1
∧n
i=1 q
j
i (xi)
)
,
then as shown in the proof of Lemma 20, there exists j ∈ [nk] and counterexam-
ples ν1, . . . , νn such that νi ∈ µSI(pi(xi))\
⋃
{µSI(qℓi ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ(xi))) = i}
and ν(xi) = νi(xi) for all i ∈ [n]. In other words, for all tuples ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
we have
νı¯j ∈ µS
I(pı¯j (xı¯j )) \
⋃
{µSI(qℓı¯j (xı¯j )) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j} = µS
I(
∧
Γ ı¯j ) \
µSI(
∨
∆ı¯j). Therefore, given such j ∈ [n
k], the counterexample for each an-
tecedent Γ ı¯j ⊢ ∆
ı¯
j is νı¯j . Since FV(Γ
ı¯
j ) = xı¯j ⊆ FV(Γ ) and ν(xı¯j ) = νi(xı¯j ), we
have that [[FV(Γ ı¯j )]]νi 
∀∃
I [[FV(Γ )]]ν , for each ı¯ ∈ [n]
nk . ⊓⊔
A.11 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Since π is a direct path, it follows that (ID) does not occur in Λ(π).
Therefore, as shown in the proof of Lemma 6, which ensures the local sound-
ness of RId \ {ID}, we obtain a sequence of valuations ν1 ⋗ . . . ⋗ νk such that
[[FV(Γ1)]]ν1 
∀∃
I . . . 
∀∃
I [[FV(Γk)]]νk .
We know that S(v1) = Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, S(vk) = Γk ⊢ ∆k = Γ1θ ⊢ ∆′1θ with
∆1 ⊆ ∆
′
1 and (LU) occurs in Λ(π), as required by the side condition of the (ID)
instance applied at vk. We show that (RD) is also required to occur in Λ(π) by
the following case analysis on the form of Γ1:
(i) If Γ1 = {p(x)}, then (LU) is the only inference rule applicable on Γ1 ⊢ ∆
which changes Γ . This required application introduces a constraint on the
left-hand side. In order to reach any sequent that has a constraint-free left-
hand side, an application of RD is also required. To specifically reach Γ1θ ⊢
∆′1θ with Γ1θ = {p(xθ)}, Λ(π) may contain additional occurrences of (LU)
and (RD), but at least one of each is required;
(ii) If Γ1 = {p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn)} with n > 1, then (LU) is immediately applica-
ble, but it would introduce a constraint that cannot be reduced (this requires
all arguments of predicate atoms to be subgoals in the constraint) thus mak-
ing it impossible to reach any sequent with only predicate atoms on the
left-hand side. Therefore, (SP) should be applied before the required (LU)
and, later on, (RD) is needed to remove the constraint introduced by (LU).
In order to specifically reach Γ1θ ⊢ ∆′1θ with Γ1θ = {p1(x1θ), . . . , pn(xnθ)},
Λ(π) may contain additional occurrences of (SP), (LU) and (RD), but at
least one (RD) is required;
(iii) If Γ1 = {φ, p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn)} with n ≥ 1, then, just as in case (ii), applying
(LU) before another inference rule that modifies the left-hand side introduces
a second constraint impossible to reduce (this requires a single constraint
on the left-hand side), thus preventing the reaching of any sequent with
only one constraint on the left-hand side. Therefore, (RD) is necessary to
remove φ before applying (LU). In order to specifically reach Γ1θ ⊢ ∆′1θ with
Γ1θ = {φθ, p1(x1θ), . . . , pn(xnθ)}, Λ(π) may contain additional occurrences
of (RD), (SP) and (LU), but at least one (RD) is required;
(iv) If Γ1 = {φ1, . . . , φm} with m ≥ 1, then (LU) is not applicable on any path
starting with Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 because we cannot create a derivation with RId that
introduces predicate atoms on the left-hand side;
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(v) If Γ1 = {φ1, . . . , φm, p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn)} with m,n > 1, then (LU) is the
only inference rule applicable on Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, and on all of the sequents derived
from it, that modifies the left-hand side. Therefore, it is impossible to reach
any sequent havingm constraints on the left-hand side, which includes Γ1θ ⊢
∆′1θ with Γ1θ = {φ1θ, . . . , φmθ, p1(x1θ), . . . , pn(xnθ)}, because (LU) would
introduce extra constraints in any derived sequent, which cannot be removed
because (RD) is not applicable.
It follows from cases (i), (ii), (iii), i.e. the ones allowing the existence of the path
π with the necessary (LU) occurrence in Λ(π), that (RD) is required to occur in
Λ(π). Then [[FV(Γi)]]νi ≻
∀∃
I [[FV(Γi+1)]]νi+1 for some i ∈ [k − 1], which leads to
[[FV(Γ1)]]ν1 ≻
∀∃
I [[FV(Γk)]]νk . ⊓⊔
A.12 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that
∧
Γ |=IS
∨
∆ does not hold, i.e. there
exists a valuation ν0 ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI(
∨
∆). Since v0 is the root of the proof,
it is also the consequent of an instance of R(v0) and, by Lemma 6, an antecedent
of this inference rule has a counterexample ν1, such that ν0 ⋗ ν1. Applying this
argument iteratively, we build a path from v0 to a leaf vk ∈ V and a sequence
of valuations ν0 ⋗ ν1 ⋗ . . .⋗ νk.
Now R(vk) 6= AX, because (AX) rules, by their side condition, cannot be
applied on sequents that accept counterexamples. Since vk is a leaf, then R(vk) =
ID and let vk+1 be the pivot of the instance of (ID) that applies at vk. Then
S(vk) = Γk ⊢ ∆k and necessarily S(vk+1) = Γk+1 ⊢ ∆k+1, where Γk = Γk+1θ,
∆k = ∆
′
k+1θ and ∆k+1 ⊆ ∆
′
k+1, for some injective substitution θ : FV(Γk+1 ∪
∆k+1)→ FV(Γk ∪∆k). We can assume w.l.o.g. that θ is surjective, by defining
θ(x) = x for each x ∈ FV(Γk∪∆k)\θ(FV(Γk+1∪∆k+1)). Since it is also injective,
by the side condition of ID, its inverse exists and νk ◦ θ−1 is a counterexample
for Γk+1 ⊢ ∆k+1. Thus we can extend the relation ⋗ with the pair (νk, νk ◦θ−1).
This argument can be continued ad infinitum and we obtain an infinite trace
τ = v0, v1, . . . in D together with an infinite sequence of valuations ν0⋗ ν1⋗ . . ..
If S(vi) = Γi ⊢ ∆i, for each i ≥ 0, by Lemma 6, we have [[FV(Γi)]]νi 
∀∃
I
[[FV(Γi+1)]]νi+1 , for all i ≥ 0. By Proposition 1, τ contains infinitely many direct
paths πj = vkj , . . . , vℓj , where {kj}j≥0 and {ℓj}j≥0 are infinite strictly increasing
sequences of integers such that kj < ℓj ≤ kj+1 < ℓj+1, for all j ≥ 0. By
Lemma 7, we obtain that [[FV(Γkj )]]νkj
≻∀∃I [[FV(Γℓj )]]νℓj
, for all j ≥ 0. Since
[[FV(Γkj )]]νkj
∀∃I [[FV(Γkj+1 )]]νkj+1
, for all j ≥ 0, we obtain a strictly decreasing
sequence [[FV(Γk0)]]νk0
≻∀∃I [[FV(Γk1)]]νk1
≻∀∃I . . ., which contradicts that ≻
∀∃
I is
a wfqo, by Proposition 2. We can thus conclude that there is no counterexample
ν0 to start with, thus the entailment
∧
Γ |=IS
∨
∆ holds. ⊓⊔
A.13 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Let p# be the number of predicates in the inductive system S, r# the
number of rules in S and s# the maximum number of subgoals occurring in
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the rules of S. Consider a structured derivation starting from a basic sequent
p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) and a path π in this derivation that leads to another basic
sequent r(x) ⊢ s1(x), . . . , sm(x) without containing any other basic sequents.
Clearly, only LU, RU, ∧R, RD and SP can be applied on π, otherwise AX and
ID would not allow us to reach the second basic sequent. The left-hand side of
the sequents along the path π allow us to apply LU at most once (on p(x)), RD
at most once (after LU, on the rule that replaces p(x)) and SP at most once
(after RD, if we are left with multiple predicates on the left-hand side). The
right-hand side of the sequents along π allows for n applications of RU, where n
is at most p#, and r# ∗ (s# − 1) applications of ∧R (there can be at most s# − 1
for every rule resulted from RU and reduced by RD, and there can be at most r#
rules). Thus, on any path between two consecutive basic sequents is of length at
most b# = 3+ p# + r# ∗ (s# − 1), which is a constant determined by the system
S.
(1) Let D be an irreducible structured derivation and suppose, by contradic-
tion, that π is an infinite path in D. Let ρ is any subsequence of π on which no
(LU) rule has been applied. The case in which ρ reaches its maximum possible
length is when it starts right after the application of LU on a basic sequent and
it extends until the next possible application of LU, while encountering the next
basic sequent and containing the results of applying all possible rules before LU.
The only rule that can be applied on a basic sequent before LU is RU and it
can occur a maximum of p# times. Thus, ρ must be finite, with a maximum
length of b#− 1+ p#. Then (LU) is applied infinitely often on π, and since D is
structured, also (RD) must be applied infinitely often. But, since the antecedent
of each application of an (RD) rule contains no constraints, and moreover, the
consequents thereof are of the form φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ ∆, the
left hand side of such sequents must have been produced by a (LU) rule with
consequent of the form p(x) ⊢ ∆, because (LU) are the only rules introducing
constraints on the left hand side of a sequent. But such sequents can only be
the antecedents of (SP) or (RD) rules, with n = 1 in the latter case. In the
case of (SP) rules, the right hand side ∆ is a set consisting of predicates only,
thus p(x) ⊢ ∆ is a basic sequent. But this must be the case also for (RD) rules,
because S has the fvi property and the assumption that (∧R) is used eagerly
after an application of (RD) to rule out conjunctions of predicates with the same
argument list. Since there are finitely many predicates in S, the number of basic
sequents is bounded thus some basic sequent must occur twice on π and (ID) is
applicable, which contradicts the assumption that D is irreducible. Then π must
be finite, and since it was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain that D is finite, by an
application of Ko¨nig’s Lemma.
(2) Suppose, by contradiction, that D(Γ ⊢ ∆) is infinite and let D1, D2, . . . be
an infinite sequence of finite, maximal derivations of Γ ⊢ ∆. By point (1), each
derivation in D(Γ ⊢ ∆) is finite. W.l.o.g. we assume that all Di are obtained
by applying more than one rule — in the opposite case, one can extract an
infinite subsequence that satisfies this condition. The number of all possible
basic sequents is p# ∗ (2p
#
− 1), as there are p# predicates that can be on the
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left-hand side and 2p
#
−1 possible non-empty subsets of predicates on the right-
hand side. Because we have a finite number of base sequents and the length of
a path between two consecutive base sequents is of finite length at most b#,
then there must exist a derivation Di in the infinite sequence chosen above that
contains a path in which the same basic sequent appears at least twice. But then
this means that Di is reducible and, thus, that Di 6∈ D(Γ ⊢ ∆), which contrdicts
our initial assumption. ⊓⊔
A.14 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. By induction on the length of the path π = p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) =
Γ1 ⊢ ∆1, . . . , ΓN ⊢ ∆N = Γ ⊢ ∆ from the derivation in which Γ ⊢ ∆ occurs.
The case N = 1 is trivial. Assuming that ΓN−1 and ∆N−1 are of the required
form, we prove that ΓN is tree-shaped and ∆N consists of finite conjunctions
of tree-shaped sets, in which all subgoal variables occur existentially quantified.
We make a case split, based on the last inference rule on the path:
– (LU) in this case ΓN−1 is tree-shaped and there exists a tree t associated
with ΓN−1 such that t(α) = r(y), for some frontier position α ∈ fr(t)
and r(y) ∈ Pred. Then there exists a rule R = 〈{φ(y,y1, . . . ,ym), r1(x1),
. . . , rh(ym)}, r(y)〉 ∈ S such that ΓN = R∪ΓN−1\{r(y)} and t[q]◦τh(φ(y,y1 ,
. . . ,ym), r1(y1), . . . , rh(ym)) replaces t in the set of trees that represents ΓN .
– (RU) in this case there exists r(y) ∈ ∆N−1 and a tree consisting of a single
node labeled with r(y). This tree is replaced in ∆N by trees t1, . . . , tk corre-
sponding to the tree-shaped setsR1(y,y
1
1 , . . . ,y
1
m1
), . . . , R1(y,y
m
1 , . . . ,y
k
mk
),
where r(y)←S R1 | . . . | Rm are the rules from the definition of r(y).
– the cases (RD) and (SP) are trivial, because the consequents of these rules
consist of sequents of the form r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢ Q1(y1, . . . ,ym), . . . ,
Qk(y1, . . . ,ym), where each Qi is a conjunction of predicate atoms. ⊓⊔
A.15 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. Let D∗(Γ ⊢ ∆) be the set of all derivations for Γ ⊢ ∆ built with
RId, together with all of their subtrees. Because, by Lemma 8, any deriva-
tion in D(Γ ⊢ ∆) is finite and D(Γ ⊢ ∆) itself is finite, then D∗(Γ ⊢ ∆)
is also finite. Since (D∗(Γ ⊢ ∆),⊑) is a wqo, it follows by Lemma 1 that
(Pfin(D∗(Γ ⊢ ∆)),⊑∀∃) is also a wqo. Therefore, we can prove this lemma by
induction on (Pfin(D∗(Γ ⊢ ∆)),⊑∀∃).
We have D(Γ ⊢ ∆) =
⋃
RDR(Γ ⊢ ∆), where DR(Γ ⊢ ∆) denotes the subset
of D(Γ ⊢ ∆) consisting of derivations starting with an inference rule R. Observe
that R cannot be (AX) because then no derivation in DR(Γ ⊢ ∆) may contain
a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅, and R cannot be (ID), because no derivation may start with an
application of (ID). We distinguish the following remaining cases for R:
– (LU) Let r(y) ∈ Γ be the predicate atom chosen for replacement and R1, Γ \
r(y) ⊢ ∆, . . . , Rm, Γ \r(y) ⊢ ∆ be the antecedents of R, where r(y)←S R1 |
. . . | Rm. It is sufficient to prove that there exists i ∈ [m] such that every
derivation in D(Ri, Γ \ r(y) ⊢ ∆) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅ with no subgoals,
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and conclude by an application of the induction hypothesis. Suppose, by
contradiction, that for each i ∈ [n], there exists Di ∈ D(Ri, Γ \ r(y) ⊢ ∆)
not containing such a leaf. Then there exists a derivation for Γ ⊢ ∆ with
the same property, which contradicts the hypothesis of the lemma. Thus,
there must exist i ∈ [m] such that every derivation D ∈ D(Ri, Γ \ r(y) ⊢
∆) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅. By the induction hypothesis, there exists ν ∈
µSI(
∧
Ri ∧
∧
(Γ \ r(y))) \ µSI(
∨
∆) ⊆ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI(
∨
∆), because
µSI(
∧
Ri ∧
∧
(Γ \ r(y))) ⊆ µSI(r(y) ∧
∧
(Γ \ r(y))) = µSI(
∧
Γ ).
– (RU) Let r(y) ∈ ∆ be the predicate atom chosen for replacement, defined
by r(y)←S R1(y, z1) | . . . | Rm(y, zm) and Γ ⊢ ∃z1 .
∧
R1(y, z1), . . . , ∃zm .∧
Rm(y, zn) be the antecedent ofR. EveryD ∈ D(Γ ⊢ ∃y1 .
∧
R1(y, z1), . . . ,
∃zn .
∧
Rm(y, zn), ∆ \ r(z)) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅, thus, by the induction
hypothesis, there exists
ν ∈ µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI(
∨n
i=1 ∃yi .
∧
Ri(x,yi) ∨
∨
(∆ \ r(y)))
= µSI(
∧
Γ ) \ µSI(
∨
∆)
because
µSI(
∨n
i=1 ∃yi .
∧
Ri(x,yi) ∨
∨
(∆ \ r(y))) =
µSI(
∨n
i=1 ∃yi .
∧
Ri(x,yi)) ∪ µSI(
∨
(∆ \ r(y))) =⋃n
i=1 µS
I(∃yi .
∧
Ri(x,yi)) ∪ (µSI(
∨
∆) \ µSI(r(y))) =
µSI(r(y)) ∪ (µSI(
∨
∆) \ µSI(r(y))) = µSI(
∨
∆)
– (RD) Let Γ = {φ(y,y1, . . . ,ym), r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym)} and ∆ = {∃z1 . ψ1(y,
z1)∧Q1(z1), . . . , ∃zk . ψk(y, zk)∧Qk(zk)}, where φ, ψ1, . . . , ψk are constraints,
r1, . . . , rm are predicates, and Q1, . . . ,Qk are conjunctions of predicates.
W.l.o.g. we assume that Sj = Sk(φ, ψj), for all j ∈ [k]. Since S has the fvi
property, each Sj is finite. We distinguish the following cases:
• m = 0, i.e. Γ contains no predicate atoms. Since p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x)❀
Γ ⊢ ∆, by Lemma 9, Γ is tree-shaped, meaning that Γ = φ(y), and φ
has no subgoal variables. Again, we distinguish two cases:
∗ if k = 0 then ∆ = ∅ and, since φ is a constraint from S, it must be
satisfiable. Thus any model of φ contradicts the entailment φ(y) |=I
⊥, and moreover, such a model exists, because S is non-filtering.
∗ else, if k > 0 we have that φ(y) 6|=I
∨k
j=1 ∃zj . ψj(y, zj) for each
j ∈ [k], because S has the fvi property. In this case we can trivially
find a counterexample for the entailment φ(y) |=I
∨
∆.
• m > 0, then the antecedent of the rule (RD) is r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢
{Qjθ | θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj)}ij=1. Moreover, by the side condition of the rule,
we have φ |=I
∧i
j=1 ∃zj . ψj and φ 6|=
I
∨k
j=i+1 ∃zj . ψj , via a possible
reordering of ∆. Since every derivation D ∈ D(r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢
{Qjθ | θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj)}ij=1) must contain a leaf Γ
′ ⊢ ∅, by the induction
hypothesis there must exist a counterexample ν ∈ µSI(
∧m
ℓ=1 pℓ(yℓ)) \
µSI(Qjθ), for all j ∈ [i] and all θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj). Because we assumed
that S is non-filtering, there exists ν′ such that I, ν′ |= φ and ν and
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ν′ agree on y1, . . . ,ym. Furthermore, because S is assumed to be non-
overlapping and φ 6|=I ∃zj . ψj , for all j ∈ [i + 1, k], we obtain that
φ ∧ ∃zj . ψj is unsatisfiable, hence ν
′ is also a counterexample for the
entailment φ |=I ∃zj . ψj , for each j ∈ [i+1, k] and thus for the entailment
φ |=I
∨k
j=i+1 ∃zj . ψj ∧ Qj . Suppose now, by contradiction, that ν
′ is a
model of ∃zj . ψj(y, zj) ∧ Qj(zj), for some j ∈ [i]. Then ν′ is a model
of ∃zj . ψj(y, zj) also. Since φ |=
I ∃zj . ψj and S has the fvi property, it
must be the case that φ |=I ψjθ for all θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj) and, moreover, there
is no other Skolem function that witnesses this entailment, besides the
ones in Sk(φ, ψj). But then it must be that ν
′ is a model of ψjθ, for all
θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj), and only for those substitutions. Since the range of each
θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj) is y1 ∪ . . .∪ym, we have that ν′ ∈ µSI(Qjθ) for some θ ∈
Sk(φ, ψj), which contradicts the assumption that ν
′ is a counterexample
of the antecedent. Then ν′ cannot be a model of ∃zj . ψj(y, zj)∧Qj(zj),
for some j ∈ [i], and since it cannot be a model of the right-hand side
for j ∈ [i+1, k] either, it is a counterexample for the entailment
∧
Γ |=I∨
∆, as required.
– (SP) Every derivation for Γ ⊢ ∆ starts with the following inference rule, for
some tuple of indices (i1, . . . , imk) ∈ [m]
mk :
〈ri1 (y) ⊢ {q
ℓ
i1
(y) | ℓ ∈ [k], f1(Qℓ) = i1}〉m
k
j=1
r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢ Q1(y1, . . . ,ym), . . . ,Qk(y1, . . . ,ym)
By our assumption, each derivation D ∈ D(Γ ⊢ ∆) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a tuple (i1, . . . , imk) ∈ [m]
mk
such that for all j ∈ [mk] there exists D ∈ D(rij (y) ⊢ {q
ℓ
ij
(y) | ℓ ∈
[k], fj(Qℓ) = ij}) does not have a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅. Then we can build a derivation
for Γ ⊢ ∆ that does not contain any such leaves, which contradicts our as-
sumption. Thus it must be the case that for all tuples (i1, . . . , imk) ∈ [m]
mk
there exists j ∈ [mk] such that for all derivations D ∈ D(rij (y) ⊢ {q
ℓ
ij
(y) |
ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ij}) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅. By the inductive hypoth-
esis, for all tuples (i1, . . . , imk) ∈ [m]
mk there exists j ∈ [mk] such that
µS(rij (y)) 6⊆ µS
I({qℓij (y) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ij}). Then, by Lemma 20, we
have µSI(r1)× . . .×µSI(rm) 6⊆
⋃k
i=1 µS
I(qi1)× . . .×µS
I(qim), proving the
claim. ⊓⊔
A.16 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Since S is non-filtering and non-overlapping, and moreover, it has the fvi
property and also p |=IS q1, . . . , qn, by Lemma 10, there exists a finite maximal,
structured and irreducible derivationD ∈ D(p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x)) which does
not contain a leaf Γ ⊢ ∅. But then, no node in D is of the form Γ ⊢ ∅, because
all descendants of such a node must have empty right-hand sides as well.
We first show that this derivation is actually a proof (i.e. all its leaves are ⊤).
Suppose there exists a leaf that is not ⊤. This means that the leaf is a sequent
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Γ ⊢ ∆, where ∆ 6= ∅. Let π be the path in D leading to this leaf. Since D is a
maximal derivation, π cannot be extended any further by the application of an
inference rule. Assume that the last inference rule applied on π is R and has the
consequent Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′. Since p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀ Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′, by Lemma 9, Γ ′
is a tree-shaped set and ∆′ consists of existentially quantified finite conjunctions
of tree-shaped sets. Also, R cannot be (AX) or (ID), because then the leaf would
be ⊤. We do a case split based on R:
1. (LU) Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is of the form R,Γ ′ \ r(y) ⊢ ∆′, where 〈R, r(y)〉 ∈ S.
If ∆′ contains at least one predicate, we can still apply (RU), which con-
tradicts the fact that D is maximal. Otherwise, because ∆′ 6= ∅ consists of
existentially quantified finite conjunctions of tree-shaped sets and it does
not contain any predicates, then it must be the case that ∆′ contains only
existentially quantified conjunctions over rules from S, obtained from previ-
ous applications of (RU), or predicate conjunctions that are not singleton,
obtained from previous applications of (RD). We distinguish the following
cases:
– Γ ′\r(y) = ∅. Then we can apply (RD) to the sequent R ⊢ ∆′ and extend
D, which results in a contradiction.
– Γ ′ \ r(y) 6= ∅. If (R) is the first occurrence of a rule (LU) then it must
be the case that Γ ′ \ r(y) = ∅, which contradicts our assumption. Then
there must have been a previous application of (LU) on π, and, because
D is structured, (RD) must have been applied between them. Therefore,
since Γ ′ is tree-shaped, Γ ′\r(x) can only contain predicates, because the
constraints introduced by (LU) are always eliminated by (RD). Then we
can apply (LU) and extend D, which leads to a contradiction.
2. (RU) Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is of the form Γ ′ ⊢ {∃zi .
∧
Ri(y, zi)}mi=1, ∆
′ \ r(y), where
r(y) is a predicate atom and r(y)←S R1 | . . . | Rm. If ∆′ \ r(y) contains at
least one predicate, we can apply (RU) and extend D, contradiction. Other-
wise, because ∆′ 6= ∅ consists of existentially quantified finite conjunctions of
tree-shaped sets and it does not contain any predicates, then it must be the
case that ∆′ contains only existentially quantified conjunctions over rules
from S, obtained from previous applications of (RU), or predicate conjunc-
tions that are not singleton, obtained from previous applications of (RD).
We distinguish the following cases:
– Γ ′ contains a predicate atom. Then we can apply (LU) and extend D,
contradiction.
– Γ ′ does not contain predicate atoms. Because Γ ′ is tree-shaped and D is
structured, Γ ′ can only contain a constraint with no subgoal variables.
Then we can apply (RD) and extend D, contradiction.
3. (RD) Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is of the form r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢ Q1(y1, . . . ,ym), . . . ,
Qk(y1, . . . ,ym) and we can apply (LU) – or even (∧R), (RU) or (SP) if
possible – to Γ ⊢ ∆, which means that we can still extend π, leading to a
contradiction.
4. (∧R) Γ ⊢ ∆ is of the form Γ ⊢ r(y) ∧ Q, ∆′′. Since we only apply (∧R) as
cleanup after (RD), Γ only contains predicate atoms and Q is a conjunction
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of predicate atoms. Then we can continue to apply (∧R) if r(y) ∧ Q or any
member of ∆′′ contains some conjunction s1(z)∧s2(z), or apply (LU), (RU),
or (SP), leading to a contradiction.
5. (SP) Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is of the form r(y) ⊢ s1(y), . . . , sm(y) and we can apply
(LU) or (RU) to Γ ⊢ ∆, which means that we can still extend π and leads
to a contradiction.
We will now show that the sequence of inference rules fired on each maximal
path in D is captured by the strategy S. Let π be an arbitrary maximal path in
D. Since D is a maximal derivation, π cannot be extended any further by the
application of an inference rule. W.l.o.g. we assume that the first application of
(LU) is not immediately preceded by an application of (RU) — otherwise, one
can obtain the same sequent by first applying (LU) before any (RU). The proof
goes by induction on the number N ≥ 1 of basic sequents that occur on π.
If N = 1, then the only basic sequent p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) occurs on the first
position of π. In this case (SP) is never applied on π, because its antecedent is
a basic sequent, and thus N > 1, contradiction. We distinguish two cases:
1. If (LU) is not applied on π, the only possibility is to directly apply AX ∈ S
to p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x), thus ending the path. Otherwise, (LU) is enabled,
which contradicts the maximality of π.
2. Else, if (LU) is applied on π, then it must be applied in the beginning,
because only (LU) and (RU) are applicable on p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) and
we assumed that no instance of (RU) immediately precedes (LU). Assume
that the first rule application on π is:
(LU)
Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′
p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x)
Then 〈Γ ′, p(x)〉 ∈ S and (LU) cannot be applied again without apply-
ing (RD) first, due to the assumption that D is structured. Since ∆′ =
{q1(x), . . . , qn(x)} after the first application of (LU), we can now apply (RU).
Because (SP) is never applied on π, either (AX) or (RD) can be applied next.
In the first case, we obtain Λ(π) ∈ LU · RU · AX ∈ S. In the second case,
if n = 1 in the antecedent of (RD), since S has the fvi property, we obtain
that the antecedent of (RD) is a basic sequent, contradicting our assumption.
Then it must be the case that n > 1, and now (RD) is not applicable any
longer, because the number of predicate atoms will always be bigger than
the number of subgoal variables in the constraint, on the left-hand side. The
only possibilities for continuation are then (AX), (ID), (∧R), (LU) and (RU).
However, (∧R) is applicable only a finite number of times, equal to the num-
ber of predicate conjunctions with the same arguments on the right and side,
(RU) can also only be applied a finite number of times, equal to the number
of singleton predicate atoms on the right-hand side, and (LU) is applicable
at most once, because (RD) is no longer applicable. In both cases, π is not
maximal, because (LU) is enabled. Then the only possibility is to end the
path by (AX) or (ID), obtaining LU·RU·RD·∧R∗ ·LU?·RU∗ ·(AX | ID) ⊆ S.
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IfN > 1, let π = τ ·ρ, where ρ starts with the second occurrence of a basic sequent
in π. As before, the first occurrence is the initial sequent p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x).
Then the inference rule applied on the last vertex of τ is either (SP) or (RD).
In the latter case, the sequent has a single predicate atom on the left-hand
side. In the former case, there is an application of (RD) optionally followed by
several applications of (∧R) preceding the last vertex of τ , and consider now
the consequent of the last application of (RD) on a vertex in τ . As argued
before, this consequent is a predicate rule of S with goal r(y), introduced by a
previous application of (LU). Since, between the antecedent of this (LU) instance
and the consequent of (RD), the left-hand side of the sequents is unchanged,
the only possibility is that (RU) has been used between them, thus Λ(π) ∈
LU · RU∗ · RD · ∧R∗ · SP? · Λ(ρ). By the inductive hypothesis, the sequence of
rules on Λ(ρ) ∈ S, thus Λ(π) ∈ (LU · RU∗ ·RD · ∧R∗ · SP?) · S ⊆ S. ⊓⊔
A.17 Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. The abstraction we need is defined as the least fixed point of an operator
F
♯
S , denoted µS
♯. An abstract assignment Y is a mapping of predicates pσ1...σn
into sets of pairs (A,E), where A ∈ P([n]) is a set of allocated arguments
and E ⊆ [n] × [n] is a set of equality constraints such that, for each model
(〈ℓ1, . . . , ℓn〉 , h) ∈ µS
sl(p) there exists a pair (A,E) ∈ µS♯(p) such that A =
{i ∈ [n] | ℓi ∈ dom(h)} and (i, j) ∈ E if and only if ℓi = ℓj . Given a quantifier-
free SL formula ϕ(x), we define the following sets:
alloc+(ϕ) = {x ∈ FV(ϕ) | ϕ ∧ ∃z1 . . .∃zk . x 7→ (z1, . . . , zk) ∗ ⊤ is satisfiable}
alloc−(ϕ) = {x ∈ FV(ϕ) | ϕ |=sl ∃z1 . . .∃zk . x 7→ (z1, . . . , zk) ∗ ⊤}
eq(ϕ) = {(x, y) ∈ FV(ϕ) × FV(ϕ) | ϕ |=sl x ≈ y}
Computing the above sets can be done in polynomial space, in general, using
the decision procedures for quantifier-free [CYO01] and Bernays-Schoenfinkel-
Ramsey SL formulae [RIS17], and in polynomial time for symbolic heaps, re-
spectively. Dually, we consider the formulae A(X) = ∗x∈X ∃z1 . . . ∃zk . x 7→
(z1, . . . , zk) and E(R) =
∧
(x,y)∈R x ≈ y ∧
∧
(x,y) 6∈R ¬x ≈ y, for any set X ⊆ Var
and relation R ⊆ Var × Var on variables.
Given R = 〈{φ(x,y1, . . . ,ym), q1(y1), . . . , qm(ym)}, p(x)〉 ∈ S, let yi =
〈yi1, . . . , y
i
ni
〉 for all i ∈ [m]. For a tupleP = 〈(A1, E1), . . . , (Am, Em)〉 ∈ µS♯(q1)×
. . .× µS♯(qm) and a relation C on the free variables of φ, we define:
ωR(P, C) ≡ ∗i∈[m]A({xj | j ∈ Ai}) ∧E({(yir, yis) | (r, s) ∈ Ei, i ∈ [m]}) ∧E(C)
ηR(P, C) ≡ ∃y1 . . . ∃ym . φ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) ∗ ωR(P, C)
Then an abstract assignment F♯S(Y) maps each predicate p into the set
⋃m
i=1 Y(Ri),
where p(x1, . . . , xn) ←S R1 | . . . | Rm and Y(R) is the set of pairs (A,E) for
which there exists a tuple of pairs P ∈ µS♯(q1) × . . . × µS
♯(qm) and a relation
C ⊆ FV(φ)× FV(φ) such that:
A = {i ∈ [n] | xi ∈ A, alloc
−(ηR(P, C)) ⊆ A ⊆ alloc
+(ηR(P, C))}
E = {(i, j) ∈ [n]× [n] | (xi, xj) ∈ eq(ηR(P, C))}
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If ηR(P, C) is unsatisfiable, alloc
−(ηR(P, C)) = x and alloc
+(ηR(P, C)) = ∅,
and there is no choice for the set A, thus no corresponding pair (A,E).
If p(x) ←S R1 | . . . | Rm are all the predicate rules for p in S, then the ab-
stract assignment F♯S(Y) maps the predicate p to the set F
♯
S(Y)(p) =
⋃m
i=1 Y(Ri).
Similarly to FslS and µS
sl, the operator F♯S is monotone and continuous, with µS
♯
as its least fixed point.
Considering again the arbitrary predicate rule R ∈ S described above, let
P = 〈(A1, E1),
. . . , (Am, Em)〉 ∈ µS♯(q1)× . . .×µS♯(qm) be a tuple of pairs and Rel ⊆ FV(φ)×
FV(φ) a relation on variables, such that ωR(P, Rel) is satisfiable. We claim
that, if the formula φ ∗ ωR(P, Rel) is satisfiable, then for each tuple of models
〈(ℓ1, h1), . . . , (ℓm, hm)〉 ∈ µS sl(q1)× . . .× µS sl(qm), there exist a valuation ν and
a heap h such that ν, h |=sl φ and ν,
⊎m
i=1 hi |=
sl ωR(P, Rel), where ν(yi) = ℓi,
∀i ∈ [m], and dom(h) ∩ (
⋃m
i=1 dom(hi)) = ∅.
The proof idea for this claim is that, because ωR(P, Rel) specifies exactly
those variables which are allocated, as well as those which are not, and the pairs
of variables which are equal, along with the ones which are not, the truth value of
φ∗ωR(P, Rel) is invariant under the renaming of the values of x∪
⋃m
i=1 yi, as long
as the allocations and equalities are preserved. Moreover, each tuple of models
〈(ℓ1, h1), . . . , (ℓm, hm)〉 ∈ µS sl(q1) × . . . × µS sl(qm) is a model of ωR(P, Rel),
for some P = 〈(A1, E1), . . . , (Am, Em)〉 ∈ µS
♯(q1) × . . . × µS
♯(qm) and Rel ⊆
FV(φ) × FV(φ). Then, for each predicate rule R ∈ S we need to check the
satisfiability of φ ∗ ωR(P, Rel), for each P and Rel, such that ωR(P, Rel) is
satisfiable.
Since there are finitely many variables in S, for a predicate pσ1...σn of S the
set of pairs (A,E) is finite, of cardinality at most 2n+n
2
. Then µS♯(p) can be
computed in an exponential number of steps9, each step requiring polynomial
space. These pairs can be stored in a table that requires 2O(n
2) space, indexed
by O(n2) bits, where each pair occupies O(n) bits. Checking the satisfiability of
a formula φ ∗ ωR(P, Rel) is possible in polynomial space.
In conclusion, we can check if a predicate rule in S is non-filtering, by checking
the satisfiability of an exponential number of SL formulae, where each satisfia-
bility check can be done in polynomial space. Thus, the overall complexity of
checking if an SL inductive system is non-filtering is EXPSPACE. ⊓⊔
A.18 Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. Deciding whether a given system is ranked is possible in polynomial space
when all constraints are quantifier-free SL formulae, by checking the validity of
φ |=sl ¬emp, i.e. the satisfiability of φ ∧ emp for each constraint φ, which is
in PSPACE [CYO01]. This bound drops to polynomial time for systems with
symbolic heap constraints, because each model of a symbolic heap Π ∧ Θ is
empty iff Θ does not contain atoms of the form x 7→ (y1, . . . , yk).
9 See [BFPG14, Lemma 4.6] for an analogous construction for inductive systems with
symbolic heap constraints.
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A.19 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. Similarly to the proof for Lemma 4, an SL inductive system S has the fvi
property if, for any two constraints φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) and ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) from
S, with goal variables x and subgoal variables
⋃n
i=1 xi and
⋃m
j=1 yj , respectively,
the following entailment is not valid:
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) |=
sl ∃y1 . . . ∃ym .
(
ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) ∧
m∨
j=1
n∧
i=1
¬(xi ∼= yj)
)
where xi ∼= yj is shorthand for
(∧
y∈yj
∨
x∈xi
x ≈ y
)
∧
(∧
x∈xi
∨
y∈yj
x ≈ y
)
.
Just as in the proof for Lemma 4, this entailment is valid only if the following
formula is unsatisfiable:
∃x∃x1 . . . ∃xn ∀y1 . . . ∀ym .
(
φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn) ∧
m∧
j=1
(
¬ψ(x,y1, . . . ,ym) ∨
n∨
i=1
xi ∼= yj
))
We know that checking the satisfiability for the above formula is in PSPACE when
φ and ψ are quantifier-free and −∗-free SL formulae [RIS17] and, thus, the fvi
problem is in PSPACE . If, however, φ and ψ are symbolic heaps, the initial
entailment problem is in ΠP2 [AGH
+14, Theorem 6], thus the fvi problem is in
ΣP2 . ⊓⊔
A.20 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof. Similarly to the first order case, as shown in the proof of Lemma 5, given
an SL inductive system S, in order to determine if S has the non-overlapping
property, it suffices to check that, for any two constraints φ, ψ of S, where
y1, . . . ,ym are the subgoal variables of ψ: (i) φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable and (ii) φ |=sl
∃y1 . . .∃ym . ψ is valid (or, conversely, that ∀y1 . . .∀ym . φ∧¬ψ is unsatisfiable).
When φ and ψ are quantifier-free and −∗-free SL formulae, then (ii) is in
PSPACE [RIS17] and, thus, the non-overlapping problem is in PSPACE . If, how-
ever, φ and ψ are symbolic heaps, then the satisfiability problem (i) for symbolic
heaps is in NP [CYO01] and the entailment (ii) between existentially quantified
symbolic heaps is ΠP2-complete [AGH
+14], and, thus, the non-overlapping prob-
lem is in ΠP2 . ⊓⊔
A.21 Soundness of the SPsl rule type in RIndsl
Lemma 21. Given a system S, with predicates p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn), such that
xi ∩ xj = ∅, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, and let Qi = 〈qi1(x1), . . . , q
i
n(xn)〉 in S, for
all i ∈ [k], be tuples of predicates. Then
µS(p1(x1) ∗ . . . ∗ pn(xn)) ⊆
k⋃
i=1
µS(qi1(x1) ∗ . . . ∗ q
i
n(xn))
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if and only if there exists a tuple ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
, such that:
µS(pı¯j ) ⊆
⋃
{µS(qℓı¯j ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j}
for all j ∈ [nk], where F(Q1, . . . ,Qk) = {f1, . . . , fnk}.
Proof. Let
⊗n
i=1 µS(ri)
def
= {(〈u1, . . . ,un〉 , h1 ⊎ . . . ⊎ hn) | (ui, hi) ∈ µS(ri), i ∈
[n]}, for some predicates r1(x1), . . . , rn(xn) in S, and Uk = Lk × Heaps. Then
the following property holds:⊗n
i=1 µS(ri) =
⋂n
i=1
(⊗i−1
j=1 U||xj|| ⊗ µS(ri)⊗
⊗n
j=i+1 U||xj||
)
Using this property, the inclusion we need to prove can be rewritten as
µS(p1(x1) ∗ . . . ∗ pn(xn)) ⊆
⋃k
i=1 µS(q
i
1(x1) ∗ . . . ∗ q
i
n(xn)) ⇔⊗n
i=1 µS(pi) ⊆
⋃k
i=1
⊗n
j=1 µS(q
i
j) ⇔⊗n
i=1 µS(pi) ⊆
⋃k
i=1
⋂n
j=1
(⊗j−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗ µS(q
i
j)⊗
⊗n
ℓ=j+1 U||xℓ||
)
As in the proof of [HLSV11, Theorem 1], because the power set lattice (2V ,⊆)
of any set V is a completely distributive lattice, for any doubly indexed family
{Sj,k ∈ 2V | j ∈ J, k ∈ Kj} it holds that
⋃
j∈J
⋂
k∈Kj
Sj,k =
⋂
f∈F
⋃
j∈J Sj,f(j),
where F is the set of choice functions f choosing for each index j ∈ J some
index f(j) ∈ Kj . In our case, let F = F(Q1, . . . ,Qk). Then,⊗n
i=1 µS(pi) ⊆
⋃k
i=1
⋂n
j=1
(⊗j−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗ µS(q
i
j)⊗
⊗n
ℓ=j+1 U||xℓ||
)
⇔⊗n
i=1 µS(pi) ⊆
⋂
f∈F
⋃k
i=1
(⊗f(Qi)−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗ µS(q
i
f(Qi)
)⊗
⊗n
ℓ=f(Qi)+1
U||xℓ||
)
⇔
∀f ∈ F .
⊗n
i=1 µS(pi) ⊆
⋃k
i=1
(⊗f(Qi)−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗ µS(q
i
f(Qi)
)⊗
⊗n
ℓ=f(Qi)+1
U||xℓ||
)
(∗)
For a fixed f , we can rewrite the right hand-side of the inclusion as
⋃k
i=1
(⊗f(Qi)−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗ µS(q
i
f(Qi)
)⊗
⊗n
ℓ=f(Qi)+1
U||xℓ||
)
=⋃n
j=1
⋃
i∈[k],f(Qi)=j
(⊗j−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗ µS(q
i
j)⊗
⊗n
ℓ=j+1 U||xj||
)
=⋃n
j=1
(⊗j−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗
(⋃
i∈[k],f(Qi)=j
µS(qij)
)
⊗
⊗n
ℓ=j+1 U||xj||
)
Then the inclusion query (∗) becomes
∀f ∈ F .
⊗n
i=1 µS(pi) ⊆
⋃n
j=1
(⊗j−1
ℓ=1 U||xℓ|| ⊗
(⋃
i∈[k],f(Qi)=j
µS(qij)
)
⊗
⊗n
ℓ=j+1 U||xj||
)
⇔
∀f ∈ F∃j ∈ [n] . µS(pj) ⊆
⋃
i∈[k],f(Qi)=j
µS(qij) ⇔∧nk
i=1
∨n
j=1 µS(pj) ⊆
⋃
{µS(qℓj) | ℓ ∈ [k], fi(Qℓ) = j} ⇔∨
ı¯∈[n]nk
∧nk
j=1 µS(pı¯j ) ⊆
⋃
{µS(qℓı¯j ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j} ⊓⊔
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A.22 Proof of Lemma 15
Proof. For AXsl, soundness follows from the side condition and its consequent
admits no counterexamples, thus the lemma is trivially true in this case. We
analyse LU, RUsl, RDsl, ∧R and SPsl individually, in a similar fashion as we did
for the local soundness of RId (Lemma 6).
(LU) Let p(x) ∈ Γ be a predicate atom, where p(x) ←S R1(x) | . . . | Rn(x).
The antecedents of Γ ⊢ ∆ are Γi ⊢ ∆i ≡ Ri(x,yi), Γ \ p(x) ⊢ ∆, where i ∈ [n]
and each yi is a tuple of fresh variables. In this case, the least solution of Γ is
µS sl(∗Γ ) = µS sl (p(x) ∗∗ (Γ \ p(x))) = µS sl(p(x)) ⊎ µS sl (∗ (Γ \ p(x)))
=
(
n⋃
i=1
µS sl (∗Ri(x))
)
⊎ µS sl (∗ (Γ \ p(x)))
=
n⋃
i=1
(µS sl (∗Ri(x)) ⊎ µS sl (∗ (Γ \ p(x))))
=
n⋃
i=1
µS sl (∗Ri(x) ∗∗ (Γ \ p(x)))
If there exists (ν, h) ∈ µS sl(∗Γ ) \ µS sl(∗∆), then (ν, h) ∈ µS sl(∗Ri(x) ∧
∗(Γ \ p(x))) for some i ∈ [n]. In consequence, there also exists (νi, hi) ∈
µS sl(∗Ri(x,yi) ∧ ∗(Γ \ p(x))) \ µS sl(∗∆) such that hi = h and for every
x ∈ FV(Γ ) we have νi(x) = ν(x). Then hi ✂ h holds trivially.
(RUsl) Let p(x) ∈ ∆ be a predicate atom, where p(x) ←S R1(x) | . . . | Rn(x).
Then Γ ⊢ ∆ has only one antecedent Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 ≡ Γ ⊢ ∃y1.∗R1(x,y1), . . . ,
∃yn.∗Rn(x,yn), ∆\p(x), where each yi with i ∈ [n] is a tuple of fresh variables.
In this case, the least solution of ∆ is
µS sl
(∨
∆
)
= µS sl
(
p(x) ∨
∨
(∆ \ p(x))
)
= µS sl(p(x)) ∪ µS sl
(∨
(∆ \ p(x))
)
=
(
n⋃
i=1
µS sl (∗Ri(x))
)
∪ µS sl
(∨
(∆ \ p(x))
)
=
(
n⋃
i=1
µS sl (∃yi.∗Ri(x,yi))
)
∪ µS sl
(∨
(∆ \ p(x))
)
= µS sl
(
n∨
i=1
∃yi.∗Ri(x,yi)
)
∪ µS sl
(∨
(∆ \ p(x))
)
= µS sl
(
n∨
i=1
∃yi.∗Ri(x,yi) ∨
∨
(∆ \ p(x))
)
= µSI(
∨
∆1)
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If there exists (ν, h) ∈ µS sl (∗Γ )\µS sl (
∨
∆), then it is also the case that (ν, h) ∈
µS sl(∗Γ1) \ µS sl (
∨
∆1). Therefore, the counterexample for the antecedent is
(ν1, h1) = (ν, h) and h1 ✂ h holds trivially.
(RDsl) Then the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ ≡ φ(x,x1, . . . ,xn), p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {∃yj .
ψj(x,yj) ∗ Qj(yj)}kj=1 has only one antecedent Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 ≡ p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢
{Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}
i
j=1. By the side condition of RD, φ |=
sl ∗ij=1 ∃yj .ψj . Also, by
Definition 5, we have µS sl(φ) ⊆ µS sl(ψjθ) for each θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj) and j ∈ [i]. In
this case, the least solution of ∆ is
µS sl
(∨
∆
)
= µS sl
 k∨
j=1
∃yj .ψj ∗ Qj
 ⊇ k⋃
j=1
µS sl (∃yj .ψj ∗ Qj)
⊇
i⋃
j=1
µS sl (∃yj .ψj ∗ Qj) =
i⋃
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl ((ψj ∗ Qj)θ)
=
i⋃
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl (ψjθ ∗ Qjθ) ⊇
i⋃
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
(µS sl (ψjθ) ⊎ µS
sl(Qjθ))
=
i⋃
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl (ψjθ) ⊎
i⋃
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl(Qjθ)
Note that also µS sl(∗Γ ) = µS sl (φ) ⊎ µS sl (p1(x1) ∗ . . . ∗ pn(xn)). If there exists
(ν, h) ∈ µS sl(∗Γ ) \ µS sl (
∨
∆), then h = h′ ⊎ h′′ such that (ν, h′) ∈ µS sl (φ) and
(ν, h′′) ∈ µS sl(p1(x1)∗. . .∗pn(xn)). It follows that we have (ν, h′⊎h′′) ∈ (µS sl (φ)⊎
µS sl(p1(x1)∗. . .∗pn(xn)))\(
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl (ψjθ)⊎
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl(Qjθ))
and, since as previously stated µS sl(φ) ⊆
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl (ψjθ), we obtain
(ν, h′′) ∈ µS sl (p1(x1) ∗ . . . ∗ pn(xn)) \
⋃i
j=1
⋃
θ∈Sk(φ,ψj)
µS sl(Qjθ) = µS sl(∗Γ1) \
µS sl(
∧
∆1). Therefore, the counterexample for the antecedent is (ν1, h1) = (ν, h
′′).
Because φ is introduced to the left-hand side by left unfolding and S is ranked,
we have h′ 6= ∅ and, thus, h1 ✁ h.
(∧R) As in the ∧R case from the proof of Theorem 3, we have that, for any
counterexample (ν, h) ∈ µS sl(∗Γ ) \ µS sl (
∨
∆), it is also the case that (ν, h) ∈
(µS sl(∗Γ ) \ µS sl(
∨
∆1)) ∪ (µS sl(∗Γ ) \ µS sl(
∨
∆2)). Therefore, ν ∈ µS sl(∗Γi) \
µS sl(
∨
∆i) for some i ∈ [2] and the counterexample for Γi ⊢ ∆i is (νi, hi) = (ν, h).
Then hi ✂ h holds trivially.
(SPsl) Then Γ ⊢ ∆ ≡ p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {∗ni=1 qji (xi)}kj=1. For each ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
,
the antecedents of Γ ⊢ ∆ are Γ ı¯j ⊢ ∆
ı¯
j ≡ pı¯j (xı¯j ) ⊢ {q
ℓ
ı¯j
(xı¯j ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ) =
ı¯j}, j ∈ [nk].
If there exists (ν, h) ∈ µS sl (∗ni=1 pi(xi)) \ µS sl
(∨k
j=1∗ni=1 qji (xi)
)
, then by
the proof of Lemma 21, there exists j ∈ [nk] and pairs (ν1, h1), . . . , (νn, hn) such
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that (νi, hi) ∈ µS sl(pi(xi)) \
⋃
{µS sl(qℓi ) | ℓ ∈ [k], fj(Qℓ(xi))) = i} for all i ∈ [n],
where h = h1 ⊎ . . . ⊎ hn and ν(xi) = νi(xi) for each i ∈ [n]. In other words,
for all tuples ı¯ ∈ [n]n
k
we have (νı¯j , hı¯j ) ∈ µS
sl(pı¯j (xı¯j )) \
⋃
{µS sl(qℓı¯j (xı¯j )) | ℓ ∈
[k], fj(Qℓ) = ı¯j} = µS
sl(∗Γ ı¯j ) \ µS sl(
∨
∆ı¯j). Therefore, given such j ∈ [n
k], the
counterexample for each antecedent Γ ı¯j ⊢ ∆
ı¯
j is (νı¯j , hı¯j ). Since h = h1⊎ . . .⊎hn,
we have hı¯j ✂ h, for each ı¯ ∈ [n]
nk . ⊓⊔
A.23 Proof of Lemma 16
Proof. Through a similar reasoning as the one in the proof of Lemma 7 and using
Lemma 15 to support the fact that h1☎ . . .☎hk, we obtain that RDsl is required
to occur in Λ(π), leading to hi ✄ hi+1 for some i ∈ [k − 1]. Then h1 ✄ hk. ⊓⊔
A.24 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. This proof by contradiction closely follows the one of Theorem 3. We
suppose that ∗Γ |=slS
∨
∆ does not hold and, by Lemma 15, obtain a path from
v0 to a leaf vk ∈ V and an associated sequence of counterexamples (ν1, h1) ⋗
. . .⋗ (νk, hk).
Clearly, R(vk) = ID. Let (vk, vk+1) be a backlink, S(vk) = Γk ⊢ ∆k and
S(vk+1) = Γk+1 ⊢ ∆k+1 such that Γk = Γk+1θ, ∆k = ∆′k+1θ and ∆k+1 ⊆ ∆
′
k+1,
for some injective substitution θ : FV(Γk+1 ∪ ∆k+1) → FV(Γk ∪ ∆k). Again,
we can assume w.l.o.g. that θ is surjective, by defining θ(x) = x for each x ∈
FV(Γk∪∆k)\θ(FV(Γk+1∪∆k+1)). Since θ is also injective, by the side condition
of ID, its inverse exists and (νkθ
−1, hk) is a counterexample for Γk+1 ⊢ ∆k+1.
Therefore, we can extend the relation ⋗ with the pair ((νk, hk), (νkθ
−1, hk)).
We obtain an infinite trace τ = v0, v1, . . . in D together with an infinite
sequence (ν0, h0)⋗ (ν1, h1)⋗ . . .. By Lemma 15, we have hi☎hi+1, for all i ≥ 0.
By Proposition 1, τ contains infinitely many direct paths πj = vkj , . . . , vℓj ,
where {kj}j≥0 and {ℓj}j≥0 are infinite strictly increasing sequences of integers
such that kj < ℓj ≤ kj+1 < ℓj+1, for all j ≥ 0. By Lemma 16, we obtain that
hkj ✄hℓj , for all j ≥ 0, which leads to a strictly decreasing sequence hk0 ✄hk1 ✄
. . ., contradicting the fact that ✂ is a wfqo. We can conclude that our initial
assumption was false, thus the entailment ∗Γ |=slS
∨
∆ holds. ⊓⊔
A.25 Proof of Lemma 19
Proof. Let (Dsl)∗(Γ ⊢ ∆) = {d | d ∈ Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∆) or ∃d′ ∈ (Dsl)∗(Γ ⊢ ∆) . d ⊏ d′}.
Because, by Lemma 17, any derivation in Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∆) is finite and Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∆)
itself is finite, then (Dsl)∗(Γ ⊢ ∆) is also finite. Since ((Dsl)∗(Γ ⊢ ∆),⊑) is a
wqo, by Lemma 1 (Pfin((Dsl)∗(Γ ⊢ ∆)),⊑∀∃) is also a wqo and we can prove this
lemma by induction on it.
LetDsl(Γ ⊢ ∆) =
⋃
R∈Rsl
Id
D
sl
R(Γ ⊢ ∆), whereD
sl
R(Γ ⊢ ∆) denotes the subset of
D
sl(Γ ⊢ ∆) consisting of derivations starting with an inference rule of type R. We
do not consider the cases R ∈ {AXsl, ID} because these inference rules do not lead
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to a leaf of the required form. Given D ∈ DslR(Γ ⊢ ∆) with R ∈ R
sl
Id \ {AXsl, ID},
we assume that, for each antecedent Γ ′ ⊢ ∆′ of Γ ⊢ ∆, the lemma holds for any
D′ ∈
⋃
IR′∈RId
D
sl
IR′(Γ
′ ⊢ ∆′) and show that it extends to D.
(LU) Let r(y) ∈ Γ be the predicate atom chosen for replacement and r(y) ←S
R1(y) | . . . | Rm(y). Then R1(y,y1), Γ \ r(y) ⊢ ∆, . . . , Rm(y,ym), Γ \ r(y) ⊢
∆ are the antecedents for the application of R = LU on Γ ⊢ ∆. If ∆ = ∅,
then, similarly to the LU case in Lemma 10, there exists a counterexample
ν ∈ µSu(
∧
Γ ) \ µSu(
∨
∆) = µSu(
∧
Γ ).
If ∆ 6= ∅, suppose that, for each i ∈ [m], there exists Di ∈ Dsl(Ri(y,yi), Γ \
r(y) ⊢ ∆) not containing any leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅. Then we can choose these derivations
and create one for Γ ⊢ ∆ with the same property, which contradicts the hypoth-
esis of the lemma. Therefore, there must exist i ∈ [n] such that every derivation
in Dsl(Ri(y,yi), Γ \ r(y) ⊢ ∆) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅.
Because p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀sl Γ ⊢ ∆, Γ is a tree-shaped set and
let T1, . . . , Tk be the singly-tree shaped sets, represented as trees labelled with
formulae, such that Γ =
⋃k
i=1 Ti. Then there exists a tree Tj , j ∈ [k] and a
frontier position αr ∈ fr(Tj) such that Tj(αr) = r(y). Then the tree-shaped
set Ri, Γ \ r(y) is represented by the singly-tree shaped sets T ′1, . . . , T
′
k, where
T ′ℓ = Tℓ for all ℓ ∈ [k] \ {j} and T
′
j = Tj [αr] ◦Ri.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists a counterexample (ν, h1 ⊎ . . . ⊎
hk, {t1, . . . , tk}) ∈ µSu(∗(Ri(y,yi) ∪ Γ \ r(y))) \ µSu(
∨
∆), where (ν, hℓ, tℓ) ∈
µSu(∗T ′ℓ), for all ℓ ∈ [k]. Because T ′ℓ = Tℓ for all ℓ ∈ [k] \ {j}, we only need to
show that (ν, hj , tj) ∈ µSu(∗Tj). Since (ν, hj , tj) ∈ µSu(∗(Tj [αr] ◦ Ri(y,yi))),
there exist some disjoint heaps h′j and h
′′
j , a context t
′
j [αr]
and a cover t′′j
such that: (i) hj = h
′
j ⊎ h
′′
j and tj = t
′
j [αr]
◦ t′′j , (ii) t
′
j [αr ]
covers h′j and
(ν, t′′j , h
′′
j ) ∈ µS
u(∗Ri(y,yi)). Since 〈r(y), Ri(y)〉 ∈ S is a predicate rule, we
have µSu(∗Ri(y,yi)) ⊆ µSu(r(y)). This leads to (ν, t′′j , h′′j ) ∈ µSu(r(y)) and
(ν, hj , tj) ∈ µSu(∗(Tj [αr] ◦ Ri(y,yi))) ⊆ µSu(∗(Tj [αr ] ◦ r(y))) = µSu(∗Tj).
Therefore, (ν, hℓ, tℓ) ∈ µSu(∗Tℓ) for all ℓ ∈ [k] and (ν, h1⊎. . .⊎hk, {t1, . . . , tk}) ∈
µSu(∗Γ ) \ µSu(
∨
∆).
(RUsl) Let r(y) ∈ ∆ be the predicate atom chosen for replacement and r(y)←S
R1(y) | . . . | Rm(y). Then Γ ⊢ ∃z1.∗R1(y, z1), . . . , ∃zm.∗Rm(y, zm), ∆ \
r(y) is the antecedent for the application of R = RUsl on Γ ⊢ ∆. Since RU
is applicable, ∆ 6= ∅. Also, the right-hand side of the antecedent cannot be ∅
because all predicates in S must be goals for at least one predicate rule of S.
Suppose that there existsD ∈ Dsl(Γ ⊢ ∃z1.∗R1(y, z1), . . . , ∃zm.∗Rm(y, zm),
∆ \ r(y)) not containing any leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅. Then we can choose D and create
a derivation for Γ ⊢ ∆ with the same property, which contradicts the hy-
pothesis of the lemma. Therefore, it must be the case that every derivation in
D
sl(Γ ⊢ ∃z1.∗R1(y, z1), . . . , ∃zm.∗Rm(y, zm), ∆\ r(y)) contains a leaf Γ ′ ⊢ ∅.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists (ν, h, U) ∈ µSu(∗Γ )\µSu(
∨m
i=1 ∃zi.
∗Ri(y, zi)∨
∨
(∆\r(y))). Then it is also the case that ν ∈ µSu(∗Γ )\µSu(
∨
∆),
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because µSu(
∨
∆) = µSu(
∨m
i=1 ∃zi.∗Ri(y, zi)∨
∨
(∆ \ r(y))) by a similar argu-
ment as in the (RUsl) case of the proof for Theorem 15.
(RDsl) Let Γ = {φ(y,y1, . . . ,yn), r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym)} and ∆ = {∃z1.ψ1(y, z1) ∗
Q1(z1), . . . ,
∃zk.ψk(y, zk) ∗ Qk(yk)}, where Q1, . . . ,Qk are separating conjunctions of pred-
icate atoms. Also, let Sj = Sk(φ, ψj), for all j ∈ [k]. Each Sj is finite because S
has the fvi property.
If m = 0, the proof is similar to the one in the (RD) case of Lemma 10.
If m > 0, then r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢ {Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}ij=1 is the antecedent
for the application of R = RDsl on Γ ⊢ ∆, where, by the side condition, φ |=
u∧i
j=1 ∃yj .ψj and φ6|=
u
∨k
j=i+1 ∃yj .ψj (with a possible reordering of ∆). If k = 0,
because S is non-filtering, y1, . . . ,ym are distinct and there are no predicates in S
with empty least solutions, it follows that µSu(∗Γ ) is not empty. Therefore there
exists a counterexample (ν, h, t) ∈ µSu(∗Γ ) \ µSu(∗∆) = µSu(
∧
Γ ). Similarly,
if i = 0, we have that µSu(r1(y1) ∗ . . . ∗ rm(ym)) is not empty and it contains
counterexamples for the antecedent. Given (ν, h, {t1, . . . , tm}) ∈ µSu(r1(y1) ∗
. . . ∗ rm(ym)), because the system is non-filtering, there exist a pair (ℓ, h0) ∈
L||y|| × Heaps such that h0 is disjoint from h and ν[y ← ℓ], h0 |=sl φ. By the side
condition of RD and the fact that S is non-overlapping, we have that ν[y ←
ℓ], h 6|=sl∃zj .ψj(zj), ∀j ∈ [k]. We obtain (ν[y ← ℓ], h0 ⊎ h, τm(h0, t1, . . . , tm)) 6∈
µSu(∃zj .ψj(y, zj)∗Qj(zj)), ∀j ∈ [k], thus (ν[y ← ℓ], h0⊎h, τm(h0, t1, . . . , tm)) ∈
µSu(∗Γ ) \ µSu(∗∆).
If both k > 0 and i > 0, suppose that there existsD ∈ Dsl(r1(y1), . . . , rm(ym) ⊢
{Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}ij=1) not containing any leaf Γ
′ ⊢ ∅. Then we can choose D
and create a derivation for Γ ⊢ ∆ with the same property, which contradicts
the hypothesis of the lemma. Thus, it must be the case that every derivation
D
sl(p1(x1), . . . , pn(xn) ⊢ {Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}ij=1 contains a leaf Γ
′ ⊢ ∅.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists (ν, h, {t1, . . . , tm}) ∈ µSu(r1(y1) ∗
. . .∗ rm(ym))\µSu
(∨i
j=1{Qjθ | θ ∈ Sj}
)
, and also, for every j ∈ [i] and θ ∈ Sj ,
(ν, h, {t1, . . . , tm}) ∈ µSu (r1(y1) ∗ . . . ∗ rm(ym)) \ µSu(Qjθ). Then h =
⊎m
j=1 hj ,
where (ν(yj), hj , tj) ∈ µSu(rj), for all j ∈ [m]. Because S is non-filtering, there
exists a pair (ℓ, h0) ∈ L||y|| × Heaps such that h0 is disjoint from h and ν[y ←
ℓ], h0 |=sl φ.
Because p(x) ⊢ q1(x), . . . , qn(x) ❀sl Γ ⊢ ∆, by Lemma 9 the set Γ =
{φ(y,y1, . . . ,ym),
r1(y1), . . . , rm(rm)} is tree-shaped, and because the number of predicate atoms
equals the number of tuples of subgoal variables, it must be a singly-tree shaped
set. Then (ν[y ← ℓ], h0 ⊎ h, τn(h0, t1, . . . , tn)) ∈ µSu(∗Γ ).
Suppose that (ν[x← ℓ], h0⊎h, τn(h0, t1, . . . , tm)) is a model of ∃yj .ψj(x,yj)∗
Qj(yj)) for some j ∈ [k]. Then ν[x ← ℓ], h0 |=sl ∃yj .ψj(x,yj) and, because S
is non-overlapping, we have that φ |=sl ∃yj .ψj . It follows that j 6∈ [i + 1, k],
otherwise it would contradict the side condition φ 6|=sl ∃yi+1.ψi+1 ∨ . . .∨∃yk.ψk.
Therefore, j ∈ [i] and, because S has the fvi property, ν[x← ℓ], h0 |=sl ψjθ, for all
θ ∈ Sk(φ, ψj). Moreover, there is no other Skolem function that witnesses this en-
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tailment, besides the ones in Sj . Then also (ν[x← ℓ], h, {t1, . . . , tn}) ∈ µSu(Qjθ),
for all θ ∈ Sj and only for these substitutions. Because the range of each θ ∈ Sj
is y1 ∪ . . . ∪ ym, it must be the case that (ν, h, {t1, . . . , tm}) ∈ µS
u(Qjθ) for all
θ ∈ Sj , which contradicts our assumption that this is a counterexample of the
antecedent. It follows that (ν[x← ℓ], h0⊎h, τn(h0, t1, . . . , tm)) cannot be a model
of ∃yj .ψj(x,yj)∧Qj(yj) for any j ∈ [k] and (ν[x← ℓ], h0⊎h, τn(h0, t1, . . . , tn)) ∈
µSu(∗Γ ) \ µSu(
∨
∆), as required.
(∧R) Similar to the (∧R) case in the proof of Lemma 10.
(SPsl) Similar to the (SP) case in the proof of Lemma 10, using a variation of
Lemma 21 in which Uk = Lk × Heaps × Cover and
⊎n
i=1 µS
u(pi)
def
= {(ℓ1 · . . . ·
ℓn, h1 ⊎ . . . ⊎ hn, {t1, . . . , tn}) | (ℓi, hi, ti) ∈ µSu(pi), i ∈ [n]}, for some predicates
p1, . . . , pn in S. ⊓⊔
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